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This thesis analyzes anti-Americanism in Russia during the era of Vladimir Putin. The 
objective is to evaluate Vladimir Putin’s anti-Americanism and the political implications 
of Putinist anti-Americanism within Russia. 
The central questions that this thesis strives to answer are: (1) What are the roots 
of Vladimir Putin’s anti-Americanism and the anti-American tendencies of segments of 
the Russian populace from the 1990s to the present day; (2) What is the relationship 
between the progression of Putin’s anti-Americanism and the anti-American sympathies 
of the Russian public; and (3) What are the potential domestic political benefits garnered 
by Putin’s hybrid authoritarian regime as a result of his anti-American rhetoric and policy 
positions?  This thesis concludes that Vladimir Putin is inherently anti-American and the 
Russian populace’s anti-American mood is directly manipulated by Putin. Putin employs 
the mechanics of his state to propagate anti-Americanism within Russia for domestic 
political reasons.   
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I. PUTINIST AUTHORITARIANISM AND ANTI-
AMERICANISM: AN INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
Is Vladimir Putin nuts?  Has he drunk too much Russian vodka?  Does he truly 
hate America?  Do the people he presides over truly hate America?  This thesis analyzes 
modern anti-Americanism in Russia during the era of Vladimir Putin. The objective is to 
evaluate Vladimir Putin’s anti-Americanism and the domestic political implications of 
Putinist anti-Americanism within Russia. 
The central questions that this thesis strives to answer are: (1) What are the roots 
of Vladimir Putin’s anti-Americanism as well as the anti-American tendencies of 
segments of the Russian populace from the 1990s to present day? (2) What is the 
relationship between the progression of Putin’s anti-Americanism and the anti-American 
sympathies of the Russian public? and, (3) What are the potential domestic political 
benefits garnered by Putin’s hybrid authoritarian regime as a result of his anti-American 
rhetoric and policy positions?   
This thesis will show that Vladimir Putin has maintained an anti-American 
attitude rooted in his youth and early adulthood in the Soviet Union. Vladimir Putin 
developed an anti-American cognitive pre-disposition. As president, Putin’s anti-
American outward volume fluctuated, but his intrinsic anti-American attitude remained. 
Vladimir Putin has been, is, and will be inherently anti-American. The hybrid 
democratic-authoritarian nature of Putin’s state necessitates his usage of authoritarian 
mechanisms to manipulate democratic practices. A unified opposition movement of the 
public and disaffected elites could pose a serious challenge to regime. This thesis will 
also show that Anti-Americanism is employed by Putin to inhibit such a union, keeping 
one or both segments loyal, or at least ambivalent. Anti-Americanism allows Putin to 
demonstrate democratic political conformity while simultaneously providing 
authoritarian political distraction. He represents the sentiments of the people who 
“elected” him by enunciating their beliefs, like anti-Americanism, even though that  
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sentiment has been manipulated by him. Anti-Americanism also distracts the two pillar 
segments of society from forming common by helping to hide the underlying problems 
associated with Putin’s regime. 
This thesis shall also demonstrate that the level of the Russian public’s hostility 
toward America tends to increase or decrease in conjunction with an increasing or 
decreasing level of anti-American vehemence displayed by Putin’s Kremlin. Putin can 
sway his nation’s moods as he deems prudent. A perpetual relationship developed 
between Vladimir Putin’s anti-Americanism and the Russian populace’s anti-
Americanism, to include the public and elite sectors. Putin’s anti-Americanism, by means 
of his authoritarian mechanisms, sufficiently arouses the public’s anti-Americanism, 
thereby allowing Putin and the political elites to feed off of that public temperament. A 
positive feedback relationship between Putin and his polity has developed, and the state 
machine powers that loop, all for the political benefit of Putin. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
A roller-coaster metaphor could easily be used to describe ongoing Russian-
American relations on the global scene. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
relations between the surviving superpower, the United States, and the dominant Soviet 
successor state, the Russian Federation, have fluctuated wildly between open friendship, 
cold-war like intransigence, and anything in between. Anti-American rhetoric and policy 
actions have emanated from the Kremlin for decades, but hostile words and quarrelsome 
policies cannot force the United States into a standoffish position toward Russia. Under 
the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russia’s continued vital importance on the geostrategic 
scene need only be demonstrated by its actions. Such actions include Putin’s baptism of 
fire in the Chechen Caucasus crisis upon ascending to the presidency in 1999, a 
revitalized Russian economic might hinged on mineral resources, an invasion of Georgia 
in 2008, their bilateral relations with several of the most potentially de-stabilizing 
regimes like those in Syria and Iran, and their permanent leverage within the United 
Nations Security Council. America must interact with Russia one way or another in this  
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ever-shrinking world. Understanding the nature and impetuses of Russian/Putinist anti-
Americanism could go a long way in aiding American policy-makers’ perception of just 
why Putin and Russia do what they do. 
As the USSR dissolved, Boris Yeltsin took the reins of the Russian Federation, 
the largest country on the globe, and the most powerful of the post-Soviet successor 
states.   Many in the West harbored dreams that Russia would transform into a democracy 
on the Western model and adopt foreign policies compatible with the current Western 
democratic states. When Putin came to the forefront in 1999, many hoped he, too, would 
continue down a path toward liberalization; it was not to be. Putin has steered the Russian 
political system’s development closer toward an authoritarian model, but not a total one; 
Russia has become what many in the broader literature refer to as a “hybrid,” or 
“electoral authoritarian,” or “competitive authoritarian” regime.1  Since the spread of 
Western democracy stagnated beyond former Soviet Eastern Europe in the 1990s, hybrid 
regimes that combine aspects of authoritarianism and institutional democracy have 
become ever-more commonplace as a result of what some call a “democratic rollback.”2 
Putin must operate in a hybrid authoritarian political system in which actors 
within the state maintain degrees of political leverage over their government and leader. 
An understanding of such a system, therefore, shall be necessary to gauge any domestic 
political implications and potential benefits of Putin’s anti-Americanism. By better 
understanding Putin’s political situation within his state and the potential political 
benefits accrued by Putin for anti-American rhetoric and policy, Western entities might 
be better able to interact with Putin rather than discounting his actions as only the whims 
of a Russian strong-man. 
                                                 
1 Nikolai Petrov, Masha Lipman, and Henry Hale, “Overmanaged Democracy in Russia: Governance 
Implications of Hybrid Regimes,” Carnegie Papers, no 106 (February 2010): 1; Grigorii Golosov, “The 
Regional Roots of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 63, no. 4 (June 2011): 623; 
Timothy Colton and Henry Hale, “The Putin Vote: Presidential Electorates in a Hybrid Regime,” Slavic 
Review 68, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 503. 
2 Larry Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State,” in Essential 
Readings in Comparative Politics, 3rd ed., eds Patrick O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Company, 2010), 235. 
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C. HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY 
One major issue investigated in this thesis is the connection between Vladimir 
Putin’s anti-Americanism and the anti-Americanism of the Russian population. That 
population includes the general public and Putinist elites. The thesis shall also attempt to 
gauge the domestic political benefits garnered by Putin’s anti-Americanism within the 
authoritarian system that he has created.   
Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane define anti-Americanism as a 
“psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American 
society in general…an attitude.”3  Ivan Krastev comes to a similar definition: “anti-
Americanism is a systemic opposition to America as a whole. It is a critique of the United 
States that transcends mere disagreement over specific policy questions or government 
decisions.”4  Anti-Americanism, therefore, cannot be reduced to an isolated incident of 
criticism or opposition to a single U.S. policy or action. An extended pattern of animosity 
in rhetoric and actions must be observable. 
Regarding Vladimir Putin, it is hypothesized that the roots of his anti-
Americanism long pre-date his rise to power. His anti-Americanism fits the 
Katzenstein/Keohane narrative of a psychological animosity toward America independent 
of reactions to the circumstances of any one instance in time. Putin did not suddenly 
become anti-American due to the Iraq War, a falling-out with George W. Bush, or long-
term trends in American foreign policy deemed antagonistic to Russia; he has always 
been anti-American at heart, and the aforementioned issues simply exacerbated a 
cognitive condition that already existed. He possesses a “cognitive predisposition,” as 
Robert Jervis would say. Putin’s negative perceptions of America became engrained in 
his psyche during the Cold War, only to remain long past the collapse of the Soviet state.5   
                                                 
3 Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane, Anti-Americanism in World Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2007), 12. 
4 Ivan Krastev, “The Anti-American Century,” Journal of Democracy 15, no 2 (April 2004): 7. 
5 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 239. 
 5 
A second hypothesis is that Vladimir Putin, though not responsible for seeding an 
anti-American psyche within his populace, has utilized the means inherently available 
within his authoritarian system to effectively fan the flames. Such means include media 
manipulation, exploitation of public fears of instability, and overtly discrediting anything 
American/Western. Many people in Russia are or have been inherently hostile toward the 
United States for decades. It is further hypothesized, nevertheless, that any widespread 
anti-Americanism within the Russian populace, as portrayed in decades of polling data, is 
directly related to increases in the Putinist regime’s anti-American vehemence. Putinist 
anti-Americanism when projected from the hierarchy of authoritarian power, therefore, 
positively influences public anti-Americanism. In light of the aforementioned definitions 
of anti-Americanism, gauging the level of Putin/Kremlin anti-Americanism over time 
will not be based on any one single-incident example of anti-Americanism, but rather 
longer-term trends in regime rhetoric and policy actions. A series of anti-American 
speeches or confrontational policy actions turns what appeared at the time to be an 
isolated example of anti-Americanism into a noticeable trend.    
It is further hypothesized that Putin’s and his nation’s anti-Americanism has 
become self-perpetuating. Putin’s anti-Americanism can be seen as in-line with the anti-
American popular consensus which his machine has manipulated. This thereby garners 
significant domestic political benefit for Putin within his hybrid-authoritarian system. 
Putin’s anti-Americanism drives public anti-Americanism which further feeds Putin’s 
anti-Americanism; a feedback loop has developed. The thesis, thereby, also hypothesizes 
that though easy to discount as the whims of a paranoid man, Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric 
and policy stances toward the United States remains pragmatic in light of the domestic 
political situation that he created for himself. Regardless of the number of “resets” in 
Russian-American relations, Putinist Russia will continue to breathe a degree of surliness 
toward the United States and West. 
D. BACKGROUND 
Anti-Americanism in Russia, whether emanating from the Kremlin or other 
segments of the populace, has influenced Russian-American relations during the ongoing 
 6 
era of Vladimir Putin. Anti-Americanism, however, was not new to Russia with Putin’s 
ascension to power on December 31, 1999. It has existed around the globe and among the 
world populace as well as within Russian politicians, elites, and the public for some time. 
Global anti-Americanism in the 1990s, according to Fouad Ajami, was much more 
rampant than many casually observed, and that post 9/11 sympathies for the United States 
were barely skin-deep and completely temporary. Historical hatred of America, thereby, 
cannot be supplanted but only temporarily hidden.6  A lingering product of Soviet times, 
Russian anti-Americanism in the 1990s under then President Yeltsin, therefore, simply 
laid dormant, waiting to resurface, which it did during the Balkan crises of the later 
1990s, followed by resurgent global anti-Americanism after the 2003 Iraq invasion.7 
Much of the recent global anti-Americanism has been attributed to recent U.S. 
actions and policy, like those within the Global War on Terror, Iraq, and economic 
globalization. Russian anti-Americanism can also be attributed to the Soviet past and the 
history of the anti-Imperialist/Western class struggle. Such an “old” form of anti-
Americanism still underlies the “new” form anchored in hatred of current U.S. policies, 
global influence, and lifestyle.8 
According to the Levada Center, one of the pre-eminent organizations that has 
been gauging Russian public opinion since the late 1980s, vast majorities of people 
polled from 2003 through 2011 consider the United States to be an aggressor state 
seeking influence or outright control of other countries. During that same timeframe, 
large pluralities or even small majorities consistently rate relations between the United 
States and Russia positively with less than a majority, and often as low as 25%, believing 
the United States is inherently unfriendly or hostile toward the Russian Federation.9  
Within such polling data, however, when observed over the course of several years, 
                                                 
6 Fouad Ajami, “The Falseness of Anti-Americanism,” Foreign Policy, no. 138 (September–October 
2003): 58, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3183656. 
7 Ole R. Holsti, To See Ourselves as Others See Us: How Publics Abroad View the United States after 
9/11 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 46. 
8 Eric Shiraev and Vladislav Zubok, Anti-Americanism in Russia from Stalin to Putin (New York: 
Palgrave, 2000), 2. 
9 “Russian Public Opinion 2010–2011” (Moscow: Levada Analytical Center, 2012), 276, 292, 293.  
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marked fluctuations underlying the overall summarizing numbers can be seen. Russian 
public opinion toward the United States, therefore, often oscillates as much as relations 
between the two states varies from “allies” to “friends” to “partners” to “colleagues” to 
“enemies” and back again. 
1. Putin’s Evolving Anti-Americanism 
Vladimir Putin himself has been the subject of much scholarly interpretation. 
Examples of Putin-era anti-Americanism are abounding, as are analyses about the 
underlying facets thereof. The roots of Putin’s personal antipathy toward the United 
States, according to some in the literature, merely represents a present day continuation 
of hostilities from the Cold War. Anti-Americanism was drilled into him as a former 
Soviet KGB agent, and such an underlying mentality did not change with the USSR’s 
collapse. Sarah Mendelson and Theodore Gerber attribute much of Putin’s positions and 
paranoia to Soviet-era thinking about Russia, the United States, and government.10  
Others assign equal importance to current events in tracing modern Putinist anti-
Americanism. Fyodor Lukyanov believes that Putin retains a grudge toward the United 
States for President George W. Bush’s alleged slighting of the Russian President during 
their first terms on issues from Iraq to NATO enlargement to unsuccessful repeal of the 
Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions. This pattern of slighting, therefore, is equally important 
to explaining the ongoing animosity.11   
Perhaps “it’s the foreign policy, stupid!”  Anti-Americanism around the world is 
as much fueled by U.S. foreign policy actions as by any intrinsic or psychological cause, 
according to some scholars, eloquently summarized by Juan Cole.12  Putin’s anti-
Americanism, therefore, could represent a common product of modern relations between 
                                                 
10 Sarah Mendelson and Theodore Gerber, “Us and Them: Anti-American Views of the Putin 
Generation,” The Washington Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2008), 132. 
11 Fyodor Lukyanov, “Why is Russia anti-American?” RT, February 24, 2012, 
http://lolo.rt.com/politics/columns/unpredictable-world-foreign-lukyanov/russia-usa-america-putin/. 
12 Juan Cole, “Anti-Americanism: It’s the Policies,” The American Historical Review 111, no. 4 
(October 2006), 1089, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/ ahr.111.4.1120. 
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two unequally powerful nations operating within the confines of the contemporary global 
environment. 
2. Putin’s Hybrid-Authoritarian Machine 
There remains a general consensus that Putinist Russia, while not a full-fledged 
authoritarian state, certainly is not a liberal democracy either. Russia operates as an 
authoritarian-democratic system, whether referred to as a “hybrid regime,” “electoral 
authoritarianism,” “competitive authoritarianism,” or even “overmanaged democracy.”  
Marie Mendras effectively sums up many writers’ interpretations in referencing “2-sided 
behavior” based on authoritarian political methods while claiming to be a democracy.   
Dmitri Trenin similarly calls Russia an authoritarian state with democratic institutions.13   
Stephen Kotkin provides a great summation to this consensus about the general nature of 
Russian government and politics: “a ramshackle authoritarian system with some 
democratic trappings.”14      
Some attribute Putin’s power-base and hold on power with the elites in Russia, 
exemplified by the works of Karen Dawisha and Charles Clover. Dawisha asserts that the 
Putin inner circle of oligarchs and businessmen within the government have supplanted 
state interests with their own personal interests; Clover claims that the corrupted elites’ 
sway over Putin is based on their non-interference in politics in return for bi-lateral 
favors.15  Others consider the Russian public at large a significant power-base for Putin. 
Timothy Colton and Henry Hale argue that Putin does maintain a broad public appeal 
with the electorate, given that his election victories have not been based solely on fraud.16  
Public polling for the duration of Putin’s time in power have borne witness to consistent 
                                                 
13 Dmitri Trenin, Post-Imperium: A Eurasian Story (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2011), 72. 
14 Stephen Kotkin, “Russia under Putin: Toward Democracy or Dictatorship?,” Foreign Policy 
Research Institute, March 2007, 
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200703.kotkin.russiademocracydictatorship.html. 
15 Karen Dawisha, “Is Russia’s Foreign Policy that of a Corporatist-Klepotocratic Regime?,” Post-
Soviet Affairs 27, no. 4 (2011), 332; Charles Clover, “Who Runs Russia?,” Financial Times, December 16, 
2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/ b4b5a2aa-26cb-11e1–9ed3–00144feabdc0.html. 
16 Timothy Colton and Henry E. Hale, “The Putin Vote: Presidential Electorates in a Hybrid Regime,” 
Slavic Review 68, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 502, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25621652. 
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majorities, often as high as 70% favorability ratings for the strong-man.17  Whether 
beholden to the societal elites, the public, or both, Putin’s grip on power does remain 
partially contingent on the acquiescence of these segments of society. A politician that 
must still appeal to his populace needs to demonstrate some level of commonality with 
that populace: shared goals, values, beliefs, etc. Anti-Americanism represents an easy 
way to show commonality with an electorate at risk of becoming disenchanted with 
Putin’s authoritarian revival. Putin can thereby garner the domestic political benefit of 
their support.  
Whatever Putin’s government and political system is called and regardless of how 
secure his position is deemed to be, the system he runs depends on him. Regardless of the 
metaphor employed, Putin is the key, the lynchpin, the apex (etc.) of the current Russian 
political organism. Because the structure relies on his “manual control,” there is a 
consensus that his absence or departure would make the system’s survival tenuous.18 
3. Implications of Russians’ Anti-Americanism 
As alluded to in polling data, the intensity of the Russian populace’s anti-
Americanism may appear consistent, but is really anything but. Its roots “do not go very 
deep” according to Vladimir Shlapentokh, who claims that the Putinist state and its media 
control are to blame for any rampant anti-Americanism in Russia. Changes in regime and 
media tone would likely lessen widespread anti-Americanism in the countryside. By 
controlling the media, the Soviets, like Putin, could control the level of anti-American 
news or propaganda that reached the isolated Soviet population and thereby directly 
control their level of anti-Americanism. Prior to 1947 that anti-Americanism was tepid at 
worst. Soviet leaders intensified or curtailed the anti-American propaganda in their media 
throughout the Cold War. Under Stalin it was rampant; under Brezhnev it was restricted 
while pursuing a mutual détente; by the time of Gorbachev’s Perestroika, it was 
                                                 
17 “Russian Public Opinion 2010–2011” (Moscow: Levada Analytical Center, 2012), 11. 
18 Nikolai Petrov, Masha Lipman, and Henry Hale, “Overmanaged Democracy in Russia: Governance 
Implications of Hybrid Regimes,” Carnegie Papers, no. 106 (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, February 2010), 26. 
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practically non-existent. So the current Russian public’s anti-Americanism may be 
widespread, but may also remain only skin deep.19   
Or are the elements or Russian society beyond the Kremlin inner-circle 
legitimately receptive to anti-Americanism?  Mendelson and Gerber hold that the “Putin 
Generation” of young Russian adults is extremely receptive to the regime’s anti-
Americanism and most youths hold similarly deep anti-American convictions.20  Even if 
so, such a group only represents a fraction of the populace as a whole. The Putinist 
regime’s survival depends on a much wider base of support. A combination of die-hard 
anti-Americans and Shlapentokh’s shallow-rooted and passive anti-Americans, created 
by the Putinist mechanisms, result in an amalgamation of the entire population that 
allows the Putinist regime to claim itself as reflective of the consensus of its governed. 
Russian society is anti-American and, therefore, so too is the Putinist government.  
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The historical and analytical methods will be employed in this thesis covering an 
extended case study of anti-Americanism in Russia during the years under Vladimir 
Putin’s leadership from 1999 until present day 2013. The analysis will focus on anti-
Americanism as a domestic political tool within an authoritarian state rather than 
focusing on its use as a geostrategic mechanism within international relations. Specific 
foreign policy actions and postures taken by Putin and Russia as well as words from his 
and his surrogates’ own mouths from the historical record will be referenced for 
contextual analysis with the goal of discerning patterns of anti-Americanism on both the 
world stage and the Russian stage during the prescribed timeline.  
The most important sources for this thesis will be transcripts of statements by 
Russian officials, including Vladimir Putin, as well as contemporary scholarly analyses 
of Russian politics and foreign policy. Of the sources surveyed, many are primary 
                                                 
19 Vladimir Shlapentokh, “The Puzzle of Russian Anti-Americanism: From ‘Below’ or From 
‘Above,’” Europe-Asia Studies 63, no. 5 (2011), 875–876. 
20 Sarah Mendelson and Theodore Gerber. “Us and Them: Anti-American Views of the Putin 
Generation,” The Washington Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2008), 137. 
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sources, to include Putin’s autobiographical interview book First Person. Primary source 
transcripts from the Russian government’s public online archives will be equally 
valuable, to include Federal Assembly addresses and Putin’s yearly multi-hour long news 
conferences and public-oriented discussions known as Direct Line in which public and 
press posit questions on a plethora of topics including foreign affairs and politics. These 
primary sources, along with the a wide array of all-encompassing academic and scholarly 
analytical resources available on the subject areas pursuant to this thesis will provide a 
solid foundation from which to delve into the necessary aspects of anti-Americanism. 
As noted already, Russian public polling data spanning the entire era of Putin’s 
leadership is widely available from different organizations, including the independent 
Levada Center, as well as the state controlled Russian Public Opinion Research Center. 
Data from such organizations will facilitate a general analysis of the levels of anti-
Americanism beyond the Kremlin walls and Russian government officials’ mouths.   
In addition, historical and contemporary works about authoritarian governments 
and the structures and functionality of such systems will provide valuable insight into the 
near-authoritarian/hybrid system now entrenched in Putin’s Russia so that an evaluation 
may be made about the utility of anti-Americanism to domestic politics. 
F. ROADMAP 
Chapter II will outline the recent historical examples of anti-Americanism in 
Putin’s Russia to include an analysis of Putin’s evolving anti-Americanism over time 
from a historical context during the Soviet era as well as post-Soviet Russia. Significant 
discussion will be offered about the role the 1990s Yeltsin years may have played in the 
exacerbation of Putin’s hostility toward America. Starting with his sudden appearance at 
the power-table in 1999 through present day 2013, the Putin years shall be analyzed for 
consistencies or fluctuations in Putinist anti-Americanism. The chapter will conclude 
with an interpretation of the many different forms that Putin’s anti-Americanism has 
taken. 
The thesis will then turn toward the nature of domestic Russian politics in Chapter 
III, namely an overview of Putin’s hybrid authoritarian regime and what makes his 
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Russia something less than an outright authoritarian state. An analysis of the role of the 
public and the elites within the Russian political sphere will also be offered. A base of 
understanding of the democratic-authoritarian nature of Russia is required. By showing 
how Putin’s hold on power still remains in the hands of his constituents, the subsequent 
interpretation of the necessity of Putin’s anti-Americanism in his domestic sphere will be 
more plausible. This chapter will also include discussion of the authoritarian mechanisms 
available to Putin and detail the means by which Putin and his government are able to 
influence public sentiment and opinion toward the United States. 
Chapter IV will then combine the nature of Russian anti-Americanism with the 
domestic circumstances of Russian politics to detail the potential domestic political 
implications of Putin’s anti-Americanism. Analysis will be offered regarding the benefits 
intrinsic to Putin’s exploitative use of anti-Americanism.  
Chapter V will conclude the thesis with a summary of the findings and 
interpretations. Recommendations for further research shall also be presented. 
Additionally, insight will be offered regarding the most recent developments in Russian-
American relations and how these instances could be interpreted based on the Putinist 






II. VLADIMIR PUTIN’S ANTI-AMERICANISM: OUTWARDLY 
FLUCTUATING BUT INTERNALLY CONSISTENT? 
Chapter II will offer a thorough examination of the central character in this thesis: 
Vladimir Putin. An analysis shall be made regarding Putin’s personal history from a 
modest childhood upbringing to eventual twenty-first century global strongman. Special 
focus shall be offered regarding his adulthood experience within the Soviet Union and his 
tenure within the anti-Western paranoia-generating machine, namely the Committee for 
State Security, or KGB. The investigations shall then turn toward Putin’s post-Soviet-era 
experiences during the Yeltsin years culminating in Putin’s own ascendency to the 
pinnacle of power within the Russian Federation. 
This chapter will provide evidence that Vladimir Putin’s anti-Americanism over 
his lifetime has been a consistent personal attribute, even if temporarily behind-the-
scenes given fluctuations in official Russian government attitude toward the United 
States. According to Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and Ivan Krastev, anti-
Americanism represents a wide mental propensity to negatively view all aspects of 
America and American society.21  This study of Putinist anti-Americanism, therefore, 
will not be reduced to any single isolated incident of criticism or opposition to a 
particular U.S. policy or action. Rather, an extended pattern of animosity in rhetoric and 
actions will be observable. Putin has always been innately anti-American based on his 
earlier history. The vehemence of his anti-Americanism, as measured by the frequency of 
anti-American rhetoric and policy actions, seems to fluctuate over the course of his tenure 
on the global scene. The roots of his anti-Americanism, nevertheless, run too deep, 
formed in his early adulthood, ossified before his rise to power, and eventually displayed 
in earnest while in power. 
                                                 
21 Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane, Anti-Americanism in World Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2007), 12; Ivan Krastev, “The Anti-American Century,” Journal of Democracy 15, no 2 
(April 2004): 7. 
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A. PUTIN’S EARLY HISTORY 
Vladimir Putin’s rise to the top of Russian political society is quite remarkable 
given his upbringing in a poverty-stricken Soviet family. He lived generally distant from 
the levers of power until he was suddenly holding those very levers. Little in his early life 
could be seen as a signal of his future. But it remains those early years and especially into 
adulthood that provided the seed of Putin’s perpetually negative outlook toward the West 
and the United States. Putin’s anti-Americanism, therefore, stems from his early life, 
failing to dramatically alter or dissipate with the evolving geopolitical situation. 
1. Early Life and College  
Born into a poor family after the Great Patriotic War, Vladimir Putin’s childhood 
was marked by standard Soviet deprivation: cramped and paltry living conditions, food 
rationing, and isolation from the outside world. A self-described childhood “hooligan,” 
Putin was at best an average student and preferred to remain in the background and 
refrained from any leadership over his classmates. His teachers, nevertheless, recognized 
his intelligence, even if his grades never seemed to coincide. His childhood instructors 
also note his generally unforgiving nature toward anyone that Putin believes betrayed 
him, regardless of the severity of the issue in question.22  He took a particular liking to 
martial arts, specifically Judo because of the necessity of hard work, physical fitness, and 
blood compared to the “ballet” nature of karate. Putin’s love of Judo would continue into 
present day, where he still routinely practices. Putin’s admiration of those who are 
willing to toil in the extreme and his general loathing of any disloyalty cast some light on 
Putin’s more recent behavior has a head of state, especially regarding alleged slights by 
the United States and international community. 
By the time Putin attended college at Leningrad State University (LGU), most 
LGU faculty were ardent communist supporters, so Putin became exposed to the most 
ardent anti-American and anti-Western Soviet propaganda while in college, under the 
                                                 
22 Nataliya Gevorkyan, Natalya Timakova, and Andrei Kolesnikov, First Person, trans. Catherine 
Fitzpatrick (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2000), 13, 16.  
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guise of receiving a higher education and studying law.23  Putin’s exposure to Sovietized 
anti-Americanism would only increase exponentially as he now fancied a career as an 
officer in the KGB to do his part to protect the Soviet Union. His childhood ambitions of 
becoming a pilot or sailor had dissipated with age. Popular movies had portrayed a 
glamorized version of service within the state security apparatus, to which Putin had 
succumb before entering college.24  His romanticized vision of spies and KGB service 
continued after his initial recruitment into the security services from the University, but 
eventually the truly mundane nature of the service hit him like so many whose pop-
culture vision of reality is quashed by true reality. 
2. Into the Shadows: Putin in the KGB and the Case for a Long Term 
Cognitive Predisposition 
The KGB recruited Vladimir Putin upon his graduating from Leningrad State 
University in 1975 with a law degree. Putin was stationed briefly in Leningrad observing 
foreigners in the city before being selected to undergo training in foreign intelligence, 
which he completed in 1983. He then transferred to Dresden, East Germany where his 
primary tasks involved monitoring politicians and communist party officials of the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR).25  Far from the idealized notion of espionage he 
had longed for, Putin described himself as merely an adept bureaucrat and information 
gatherer.26  His assignments within the KGB never lived up to his lofty expectations. The 
indoctrination process of becoming a KGB officer, however, could only exacerbate what 
anti-American sentiment he had developed in childhood under the Soviet propaganda 
system and in college during a Communist education. 
Once a member of the KGB, always a member of the KGB. Vladimir Putin’s time 
in the Soviet-era secret police could be analogous to someone who is initiated in the 
Society of Freemasons: not an official cult, but nevertheless possessing a definitive cult-
                                                 
23 Eric Shiraev and Vladislav Zubock, Anti-Americanism in Russia from Stalin to Putin (New York: 
Palgrave, 2000), 140. 
24 Gevorkyan, First Person, 17. 
25 Ibid., 60. 
26 Ibid., 63. 
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like culture. As a KGB officer, even if assigned to relatively non-critical posts with 
seemingly menial duties, Vladimir Putin was effectively indoctrinated to mistrust the 
United States and the West. Their anti-Americanism was involuntarily forced into them. 
Putin had been trained to rely on a certain thought process, a KGB mentality in which 
official manufacturing of enemies within and outside the nation is commonplace.27  
Those enemies or manipulators often take the alleged form of a Western entity, be they 
real or fictitious. Putin, like many of his Soviet-era predecessors, was trained to fabricate 
the illusion of an enemy and brought up to discount almost anything emanating from the 
official (or even unofficial) correspondence of the Cold War-era United States and 
Western civilization as a whole. Publically available statements, documents, or 
transcripts are assumed to contain nothing but misleading information; “therefore, the 
harder the Americans try to convince the Russians that they mean no harm, the more the 
Kremlin becomes suspicious of U.S. intentions.”28 
The prominent academic Robert Jervis would presume that Vladimir Putin suffers 
from a severe case of cognitive predisposition. Jervis holds that a person’s past 
experiences and observance of events will dramatically affect how they interpret 
information in the future.29  Jervis further expounds on four variables that determine how 
much an event might affect an individual’s perceptual predisposition; the more variables 
that are applicable, the more likely the event dramatically affects said person’s 
predispositions. America’s and the Soviet Union’s global chess game that has come to be 
called the Cold War represents the event under study in this. Specifically important is 
Putin’s involvement in it. The first variable asks if the person experienced the event first 
hand. As a citizen of the Soviet Union and KGB officer stationed in divided Europe, this 
variable obviously applies to Putin.  
                                                 
27 Sarah Mendleson and Theodore Gerber, “Us and Them: Anti-American Views of the Putin 
Generation,” The Washington Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2008): 131. 
28 Mikhail Tsypkin, “Russian Politics, Policy-making and American Missile Defense,” International 
Affairs 85, no. 4 (2009): 782. 
29 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), 217. 
 17 
Second, did the event occur in the person’s early adult life?  Putin joined the KGB 
right after college and matured during the height of the Cold War, so yes. Third, did the 
event result in big consequences for the person’s nation or the person himself?  Another 
obvious yes. Fourth, was the person familiar enough with the international environment 
that alternative explanations or perceptions regarding the event in question were 
possible?  Putin, in the KGB and stationed in a foreign state, was much more informed of 
the international situation than the average Soviet citizen. He, therefore, was exposed to 
alternate analyses of the international situation than what a Soviet commoner heard 
exclusively from state-run propaganda.30  All four of Jervis’s variables are applicable to 
Putin’s experience in the Cold War and KGB. This implies that those events, and in the 
case of this thesis the anti-Americanism intrinsic in those events, dramatically affected 
Putin’s perceptions. Those perceptions became engrained in the cognitive psyche of Putin 
during the Cold War, only to remain long past the end of the Cold War and persist to the 
modern day.  
A person’s beliefs are formed from cognitive predispositions toward information 
that is consistent with their pre-held views. Information that subsequently conforms to 
those pre-held views resonates even more. It is a psychological-unmotivated bias that 
reinforces and strengthens the original belief, which can make it extremely difficult for 
leaders of states to receive and interpret signals properly, potentially conflating their 
threat perceptions. “The decision maker who thinks that the other side is probably hostile 
will see ambiguous information as confirming this image, whereas the same information 
about a country thought to be friendly would be taken more benignly.”31  Putin matured 
in the Soviet and KGB establishment to consider the United States hostile, so anti-
Americanism was warranted, and his perception of information about the United States, 
therefore, will only further endorse such a pre-ordained hostile character, making 
ongoing anti-Americanism equally warranted.   
                                                 
30 Ibid., 239. 
31 Robert Jervis, “Perceiving and Coping with Threat,” in Perspectives on Security, ed. Richard Lebow 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 18. 
 18 
Many influential world leaders consider the global environment to be one of 
perpetual high conflict, whereas some see opportunities for common interests more 
likely.32  One could probably place Vladimir Putin in the former grouping, due in no 
small part to his predisposed KGB-mentality. Many of Putin’s remarks in this, the 21st 
century, could as easily have been pronounced thirty years ago on a podium under a 
collection of red Soviet flags. In 2012 he, like so many Soviet leaders before him, 
resorted to missile rhetoric, calling nuclear weapons the primary mechanism for ensured 
Russian security while simultaneously denouncing Russian free press reports during the 
1990s that painted the armed forces in any negative light, calling such anti-military or 
anti-government news stories a “real moral crime and an act of treason.”33  The Soviet 
mentality equated any anti-government rhetoric as potentially treasonous, to be 
investigated and prosecuted by the KGB. Additional examples of Putin’s KGB-mentality-
inspired actions and rhetoric, specifically toward the United States, shall be offered in 
subsequent sections of this chapter. 
B. YELTSIN ERA 
 Vladimir Putin would witness firsthand the collapse of first the Warsaw Pact, and 
then the Soviet Union itself. A turbulent decade followed the surprisingly bloodless birth 
of the new Russian Federation. Though Putin would remain estranged from the key levers 
of national power and prestige until the end of the 1990s, he would, nevertheless, bear 
witness to a series of events internal and external to the Russian state, events in which the 
United States and West remained active participants. Such events would only further 
frustrate a Russian already so intrinsically suspicious of America and further ossify 
Putin’s Soviet-era anti-American disposition. 
1. Putin in the Aftermath of Collapse 
Vladimir Putin, upon leaving East Germany as the Berlin Wall collapsed, and the 
Cold War with it, returned to Leningrad. He accepted a KGB posting within the 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 19. 
33 Vladimir Putin, “Being strong: National security guarantees for Russia,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 
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University after refusing a higher-level position at KGB headquarters in Moscow. He 
claimed to have recognized the futility of working in Moscow as the Soviet system 
slowly disintegrated and desired no part in it.34  In the aftermath of the 1991 coup attempt 
against Gorbachev, Putin resigned from the KGB and further attached himself to a former 
friend and now mayor of Leningrad, Anatoly Sobchak, eventually rising to the position of 
deputy mayor of (renamed) St. Petersburg.35  Upon Sobchak’s defeat in the elections of 
1996, Putin accepted a series of positions within Russian President Yeltsin’s 
administration in Moscow, where he quickly caught the respectful eye of the aging 
president. Putin eventually rose to a position within the Presidential Staff, followed 
shortly thereafter by an appointment in July 1998 to head the Federal Security Service 
(FSB), the primary successor organization to the KGB, a job that Putin had recently told 
his wife he would never take even if offered.36  Merely one year later Putin would be 
named acting Prime Minister of the Russian Federation and Boris Yeltsin’s designated 
successor. But events involving the United States and Russia that occurred in the 
timeframe between Putin’s return from Germany and his sudden placement into power at 
the close of the decade would permanently affect the eventual second President of the 
Russian Federation. These events would seem to confirm the pre-conceived notion of an 
inherent hostility by America toward Russia.  
2. Russia and the West in the 1990s: U.S. as an Inadvertent Contributor 
to Putinist Anti-Americanism 
While working for most of the 1990s in behind-the-scenes positions in St. 
Petersburg city government or within the Yeltsin bureaucracy in Moscow, Putin could 
observe from afar the nature of post-Cold War Russian relations around the globe. Too 
often, the weakened Soviet successor state that became Russia was incapable of 
influencing global events like its superpower predecessor. The United States and West, 
operating in a new environment lacking any geostrategic bipolarity, engaged in actions 
that could only further alienate Russia and its current and future leaders. Though Putin 
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35 Ibid., 80. 
36 Ibid., 106. 
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could not directly affect the repeated snubbing that Yeltsin incurred from the West, the 
memories of how the United States and West treated a weakened Russia would affect 
how the next generation of Russian leaders viewed their former Cold War opponents. Of 
the many events in Russian-Western relations during the 1990s, several critical issues 
shall be examined more thoroughly, issues in which the United States and its allies 
inadvertently contributed to fomenting anti-Americanism in Russia and justifying anti-
Americanism in the eyes of eventual President Putin. 
a. NATO 
Vladimir Putin has never hidden his general disdain for Cold War era 
security institutions, especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was 
organized as a counter to Stalinist Soviet aggression. Vladimir Putin has continually 
affirmed that NATO’s time of relevance should have died when the Red Flag came down 
over the Kremlin. The institution’s continued existence, therefore, remains a root of 
contention between Russia and the West, especially the United States, given the 
observation that America remains the dominant motivator within NATO. Though not 
officially an antagonist to Russia, the dominant Soviet successor state, NATO’s declared 
positions and actions during the decade immediately after the end of the Cold War helped 
exacerbated Putin’s and Russia’s apprehensions, apprehensions which also stem from a 
Cold War/KGB cognitive predisposition as discussed previously.   
The 1990s would proceed and result in a legacy of tension and downright 
slighting of Russia at the hands of NATO. Perceived snubbing of Russia did not help in 
calming tensions. NATO routinely voiced support for NATO-Russian cooperation and 
coordination under Yeltsin, but equally consistently negated any Russian moves for true 
equal-partner status in settling issues pertinent to both parties. With the signing of the 
Founding Act in 1997 between NATO and then Russian President Yeltsin, Russian 
participation in NATO decision making through the new Permanent Joint Council failed 
to live up to the expectations many had envisioned. Though Russia had been granted a 
seat at the table, that table was not always in the same room where the substantive 
discussions were occurring. The Russian delegation to NATO, though granted 
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ambassadorial status, was not allowed to reside at NATO headquarters, nor given 
universal access to NATO meetings, nor vote or veto any NATO decision making.37  A 
senior State Department official summed up the PJC relationship well: “…the PJC is a 
consultative mechanism…It does not mean a situation in which you are obliged to 
negotiate.”38  With America, the dominant NATO member, allegedly dismissing the PJC 
as a venue only for semantic exercise and Russia denied any real power within it, this 
first attempt at improved NATO-Russian relations could, therefore, be easily witnessed 
as an affront by NATO and the United States against Russia.   
Intertwined within the issue of prospective NATO-Russian partnership 
were tensions over the proposed expansion of NATO into Central and Eastern Europe. In 
the fledgling years of Yeltsin’s Russia, a pleasant relationship developed between the 
new Russian president and U.S. President Clinton. Yeltsin, rightly or wrongly, interpreted 
signals from the Clinton Administration in 1993 that implied an American willingness to 
accede to Russian involvement in Russia’s “near abroad” just like U.S. hegemony in the 
Western Hemisphere. America allegedly granted the Russian Federation a sphere of 
influence within the former Soviet space. Such an unofficial agreement between the two 
leaders, with Yeltsin easing his opposition to NATO expansion in exchange for 
America’s, and thereby NATO’s, acceptance of Russian designs in Eurasia failed to 
materialize. By 1995, the United States had reverted from a conciliatory Russian foreign 
policy and called for NATO expansion regardless of Yeltsin’s protests.39  NATO and the 
United States had snubbed Russia and Yeltsin over the issue of NATO expansion once, 
only to be repeated again. The Russian government, under Yeltsin, tacitly acquiesced to 
NATO’s expansion plans into Eastern and Central Europe in 1997 in exchange for what 
they hoped and assumed would be a seat at the table in the form of the PJC as discussed 
above. The envisioned partnership for Russia, however, failed to come to true fruition, 
while NATO’s desired membership boom proceeded after the Madrid Summit of that 
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same year with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary all joining the alliance.40  Russia 
had been slighted yet again over the issue of NATO expansion.   
Hard liners in Russia found their fears vindicated when some U.S. Cold 
Warriors, like Henry Kissinger, asserted that NATO enlargement during the 1990s should 
proceed quickly not to hasten democratic development in Europe or prepare for 
totalitarian resurgence in Russia, but rather exploit Russia’s weaknesses and gain a 
supreme geostrategic position on the continent.41  Anti-NATO Russians, like Putin, could 
thereby claim that NATO enlargement had been and will continue to be an affront against 
Russia, to threaten the Federation just like it had done to the Soviet Union. 
b. Balkans 
As NATO expanded ever closer to the Russian homeland, the Yeltsin 
years also bore witness to a NATO willing to engage in alleged unilateral uses of force on 
the international scene, specifically in Southeast Europe during the Balkan wars spanning 
the 1990s. In his 2000 autobiography referencing both Kosovo and Chechnya, Putin 
adamantly refutes the right of any state to intercede in the internal affairs of another state, 
in violation of international law, even if under humanitarian auspices.42  Regarding 
NATO, or any Western-coalition-based organization, Putin, in his infamous Munich 
Speech in 2007, declared it unjust for any pre-emptive military action to occur against a 
sovereign state without the United Nation’s consent, a body that Russia has considerable 
leverage in.  “The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is 
sanctioned by the UN. And we do not need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN.”43  
Rather unsubtly, Putin intimates that Russia should have had a say and should continue to 
have a say in any use of force around the globe and that NATO or NATO-member states 
(i.e., the United States) acting otherwise cannot occur.   
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Russia, with Putin in the background, observed multiple non-UN 
mandated uses of force in the 1990s, especially in the Balkans. During the Bosnian crisis 
of 1993–1995, Russian intransigence persisted within the United Nations Security 
Council regarding expanding the UN mandate to employ military force against the 
Bosnian Serbs. The impetus for a military halt to the Bosnian genocide therefore shifted 
to NATO, which initiated armed action against the Serbs in 1995 absent further UN (i.e. 
Russian) authorization.44  Four years later, NATO action against Slobodan Milosevic’s 
Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis serves as the quintessential case of NATO 
aggression absent international mandate. Once again, Yeltsin’s Russia’s obstruction 
within the UN Security Council compelled NATO to assume the mantle of primary 
decision making organization on the Kosovo issue.45  The Yeltsin government 
considered NATO’s effort a unilateral attack against a sovereign state that had not 
attacked a NATO member. NATO’s reassurances that the alliance remained a purely 
defensive entity had been dashed.46   
NATO had now effectively usurped the United Nations as the primary 
peacekeeping organization and “substitute” for the UN as Euro-region political arbiter.47  
Russian attempts to admonish NATO for their unilateral action within the international 
community fell flat. A Russian-submitted UN Security Council resolution declaring 
Operation Allied Force (NATO’s Kosovo action) unlawful received only three supporting 
votes, two of them Russia’s and China’s.48  Russia’s power-grip and influence within the 
UN was now moot in light of a new U.S. dominated NATO willing to bypass the Security 
Council. Russia, nevertheless, continued to exercise its muscle within the UN in the 
aftermath. They ensured that any subsequent Kosovo-related resolutions never even 
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faintly contained wording that could be construed as the international body condoning the 
NATO armed action. Only references to alleviating human suffering within common 
international laws pertaining to humanitarian interventions could pass the Security 
Council.49  Putin extensively details the late 1990s Balkan turmoil and the NATO action 
against Serbia over Kosovo as a rallying cry of anti-NATO/anti-Western sentiment 
within Russia, given how his country was not treated as an “equal partner.”50   
An enlarged NATO that remains beholden to the United States, both of 
which only grew stronger in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, now proved willing to 
employ military force which it had not done in its entire Cold War existence. Repeated 
snubbing by the West toward Yeltsin’s Russia over issues of partnership and security also 
contributed to consternation in Russia. Though seemingly benign in the eyes of the 
United States the and West, is there any confusion as to how such actions might irk an 
already cognitively pre-disposed anti-American individual like Putin into retaining if not 
permanently psychologically justifying his own anti-Americanism?  And then, at the end 
of the 1990s, the lifelong anti-American Vladimir Putin would abruptly emerge from 
obscurity and become the leader of Russia. 
c. Economic Collapse and the Absence of U.S. Aid 
Though a topic for a much more in depth analysis beyond the scope of this 
thesis, it is worthy of a brief discussion of the economic turmoil in Yeltsin’s Russia and 
more importantly the perceived lack of support offered by the United States to help the 
newfound “capitalist democracy” in achieving Yeltsin’s promised rapid recovery. 
Yeltsin’s “shock therapy” to the post-Soviet Russian economy failed to improve the lives 
of most Russians, leaving many to question the validity of U.S. styled free market 
capitalism and democracy which had been the basis for a temporary euphoric pro-
American mood immediately after the democratic revolution.51  Communism had been 
blamed for the rotten lives of the Soviet citizens; the United States combatted 
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communism; therefore America and its economic and government systems must be 
good.52  Within a few years of the Soviet collapse, people had become increasingly 
disillusioned with the United States. Little to no economic aid had been proffered; 
America had benefitted the most from the USSR’s collapse and therefore a lack of aid 
must have been simply another means by which America kept Russia on its knees and 
incapable of re-asserting its former position on the world scene.53   
America had thereby denied Russia an economic recovery while 
exploiting Russian weakness to gain a greater influence around the globe and especially 
in continental Europe through NATO. Putin observed and took note; the absence of U.S. 
aid was but one more piece of evidence supporting his anti-American pre-disposition that 
America was pre-disposed to antagonism toward Russia. Putin would be unable to 
influence the situation until nearing the turn of the next century, his century.  
C. PUTIN: A SUDDEN THRUST INTO THE LIMELIGHT 
After a short lived tenure as head of the FSB, Putin would be strategically 
appointed as a Deputy Prime Minister under Yeltsin in August 1999, becoming acting 
Prime Minister that same day following the dismissal of the government. Vladimir Putin 
had suddenly become Boris Yeltsin’s chosen successor to be the next President of the 
Russian Federation.  
1. Putin’s Short-Lived Premiership and Acting Presidency 
Claiming to have had an unemotional reaction to his surprise appointment as 
Prime Minister by Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin would waste little time in defining himself to a 
nation in which most people had no idea who he was. Putin’s several-month-long 
premiership would come to be dominated by one issue: the ongoing conflict in the North 
Caucuses and the violent terror attacks in Russia proper.  
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a. Crisis in Chechnya 
Conflict between Russia and the North Caucuses region of Chechnya had 
been ongoing for decades. President Yeltsin launched an ill-fated military operation 
against the region in the mid-1990s with disastrous results. The operation also drew 
vociferous condemnation from certain segments within the United States.54  As Putin 
came into the premiership in 1999, the Chechen conflict had spilled beyond the borders 
of the break-away republic. Putin, in his autobiography, again portrays himself as morally 
ambivalent to the potential political consequences, or benefits, of his actions toward 
Chechnya. He cites his appointment to Prime Minister as providing him with the 
opportunity to perform a “historic mission” to secure the future of the Russian Federation 
from an escalating succession of regional instability should Chechnya become 
independent.55  Such a domino theory of Russian strategic integrity would remain 
essential in Putin’s policy decisions for the duration of his tenure in power. After a series 
of bombings in Moscow, to which some inside Russia and the international community 
point blame at government security services, Putin launched a heavy-handed military 
operation into Chechnya to root out the “bandits” as Putin referred to them, and 
subsequently restore security.56   
The invasion incited quick and angry condemnation from the United 
States and West, with calls for international peacekeeping operations and an immediate 
Russian withdrawal. Putin, as Prime Minister and eventual acting President following 
Boris Yeltsin’s surprise resignation on December 31, 1999, repeatedly rebuffed any such 
attempts. Asserting Chechnya as an internal security problem outside the purview of any 
American, foreign, or international oversight, Putin exhorted that no state should have 
any right to interfere in the internal affairs of another state, again alluding to the 
U.S./NATO action against Yugoslavia over Kosovo.57  America’s demand for 
involvement and consultative rights regarding this Russian internal affair could only 
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provide further reinforcing proof of American designs to undermine Russia, a belief that 
an anti-American Putin had come to accept over the previous decades. This would not be 
the last time Putin employed such rhetoric toward the United States and her allies. 
Foreign involvement in any internal Russian affairs or criticism thereof, perceived and or 
fictitious as it may be, would never be ignored by Vladimir Putin. 
b. Presidential Election of 2000 
During Putin’s stint as acting president and his 2000 campaign for the 
presidency, the Russian people’s focus had come to incorporate growing security issues 
along with the habitual economic woes. With Kosovo still on peoples’ minds and 
Chechnya still raging, Putin was able to tailor his message and play to peoples general 
nervousness to promote his goals for internal security and order and a rejection of foreign 
(i.e. American/Western) influences.58  The success of the military operations against 
Chechnya and Vladimir Putin’s unrelenting perseverance and strength compared to an 
elderly Yeltsin proved sufficient enough to propel Putin to an electoral victory in the 
March 2000 presidential elections. Some analysts, including Marie Mendras, also point to 
a general lack of credible alternatives to Putin that accounts for Putin’s first round ballot 
victory, in conjunction with election irregularities and fraud,.59  Peter Baker and Susan 
Glasser similarly extoll the employment of Russian state resources (media) to thoroughly 
discredit the few potentially viable Putin alternatives on the ballot.60  This would 
definitely not be the only time the state media would be employed as a political weapon.   
Putin was inaugurated for his first full term in May. His May 2000 
inauguration speech, however, contained no such anti-American or anti-foriegn 
references, pointing instead to vague goals of a “free, prosperous, wealthy, strong, and 
civilized land,” never mentioning Chechnya, the United States, or any other nation by 
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name.”61 He instead reserved most of his speech to touting the values and effectiveness 
of democracy that had just been demonstrated in the peaceful election and transition of 
power. That sentiment would evolve over the coming years and will be examined more in 
depth in subsequent sections of this thesis. Though subtle during his first months in the 
Presidency, Vladimir Putin had, nevertheless, displayed a penchant for animosity toward 
the United States and West, though isolated to specific instances of foreign policy 
disputes. Over the coming eight years of his presidency, Putin’s intrinsic anti-
Americanism that seemed sporadic and insulated would become widespread and spill 
over beyond the isolated issues of Kosovo, Chechnya, and state sovereignty.  
D. PUTIN’S FIRST PRESIDENCY 
Vladimir Putin’s first full term as President of the Russian Federation proved 
wrought with challenges. The Chechen conflict continued, economic troubles persisted, 
and Russia was left to decide how it wanted to operate within the global community. This 
new Russian President would suddenly be forced to deal with a new American President 
within a world order shocked by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and their 
aftermath. How could a pre-disposed anti-American Russian President cope?  Could he 
simply place his real feelings on the back-burner and wait for an opportune time to bring 
them back?  Or did the change in the global environment spurn a much-overdue change 
in prejudice?  As this chapter will show, the evidence points toward the former.   
Anti-American rhetoric and policy from Putin’s state would take a temporary 
hibernation in light of (then) current events. By the end of his first term and into his 
second, events would unfold that would spurn an awakening in Putin’s anti-American 
proclivities and provide the means to promote them to Russian society as a whole.  
1. Integrate Into or With the West… or Neither? 
Vladimir Putin faced several conundrums during his first years as president. One 
overarching problem remained unsettled from the days of Boris Yeltsin’s ascendency to 
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power in the wake of the USSR’s collapse. How would a newly non-Communist Russia 
interact with the Soviet Union’s former enemies: the West (and the United States)?  
Noted Russian expert Dmitri Trenin posits that Yeltsin sought rapid democratization and 
free-market capitalization within the new Russia to affect a quick integration into 
Western society, effectively turning the former Soviet state into a European State on a 
Western model.62  Though Peter the Great may have enjoyed some success in dragging 
Russia into an 18th century modernity by Tsarist mandate, Yeltsin’s attempt to power 
Russia into the modern 20th century proved more problematic. 
While serving as Prime Minister, Putin explicitly referred to Russia as a part of 
Europe, in sync with what Yeltsin had been attempting to portray for most of the 1990s.63 
Once president, however, Putin’s stance on Russia’s position vis-à-vis the West altered 
from Yeltsin’s early 1990s fantasy. Though he would repeat the assertion that Russia was 
a part of Europe for several years, he concurrently emphasized Russia’s goal of 
“integration with Europe.”64  Feeding off of public angst over the state of affairs at the 
end of the Yeltsin era, both economic and governmental, Vladimir Putin would exploit 
people’s frustrations with Yeltsin-era economic and political dysfunction to abandon any 
inertia that existed to transform Russia into a Western-style state. He claimied Russia was 
not appropriate for such a type of democracy and government system.65  Since Putin’s 
Russia abandoned attempts to become an Americanized/Westernized state, it instead 
sought its own path toward democracy and economic capitalism while integrating with 
the West.  9/11 offered the perfect opportunity to re-assert Russia’s position on the global 
scene and establish Russia as a critical influence in American and Western decision-
making without being truly Western. As we shall see in subsequent sections, however, 
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integration and cooperation with the United States and West would not to be the end-state 
in Russian foreign relations, but more of a transitional stage. And Putin’s natural anti-
Americanism, silenced but always present, could be easily un-silenced if a non-
integrationist environment should develop. 
2. The Attacks of 9/11 and the Aftermath 
The 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States presented Russia and America 
with a golden opportunity to forge a new and lasting partnership. Vladimir Putin was the 
first international leader to phone President Bush on the day of the attacks, and in public 
statements that day reiterated “we are with you…we support you.”66  Vladimir Putin, to 
any observer, appeared to harbor no anti-Americanism in the aftermath of the attacks. 
Putin was legitimately disturbed and horrified by the attacks and even ordered the 
cancelation of an ongoing Russian military exercise in the Pacific that day so as not to 
distract and burden U.S. forces beyond the unfolding crisis.67  Putin, however, would 
seize on the nature of the attacks and continually parallel Russia’s ongoing conflict with 
Chechnya on similar terms as the new war against terrorism. Such notions were disputed 
outside Russia where Chechen terrorist attacks have been attributed to Russian brutality 
in Chechnya over the years.68  Over the ensuing months (and years) he claimed that 
Russians “entirely and fully share and experience your pain,” and “Chechnya cannot be 
viewed out of the context of the fight against international terrorism.”69 
Vladimir Putin, in addition to repeated rhetorical proclamations in support of U.S. 
post-9/11 efforts, initiated policy actions beyond what any cold-warrior thought possible. 
Against the opposition of his own military establishment, Putin acceded to U.S. military 
presence in Central Asia to conduct operations against the Taliban.70  He re-asserted the 
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freedom of former Soviet Central Asian states to establish U.S. military bases on their 
territory.71  He promised intelligence sharing on Afghanistan and logistical over flight 
authorization for operations in Afghanistan as well as Russian cooperation with a post-
Taliban government.72  During the short interim period of the Bush administration before 
the attacks, the dominant issue concerning bilateral relations between America and 
Russia was ballistic missile defense; Bush and Putin were even able to reach equitable 
terms on this issue in light of the new atmosphere of global anti-terror cooperation. Putin 
agreed to “liberalize” the ABM treaty to allow continued U.S. testing of BMD 
components, though not deployment, and eventually accepted U.S. withdrawal from the 
treaty without incurring a diplomatic crisis. Bush, in 2002, agreed to sign the Treaty of 
Moscow regarding additional nuclear arms reductions solely because he recognized 
Putin’s domestic necessity in having an official piece of paper vice relying on the words 
of two mutual friends.73  The dynamics of the Putin-Bush friendship shall be discussed 
further in the next section. 
It seemed that a new era of Russian-American friendship and partnership had 
come to fruition, and it only required a cataclysmic upheaval in the geostrategic paradigm 
for it to occur, namely 9/11. One cannot take anything for its face value. While 
paralleling Russian and American concerns, claiming Russian and American anti-terror 
interests simpatico, walking the walk, and talking the talk of a new era in American-
Russian relations, Putin and his cadre never stopped keeping a tab on Russia’s assistance 
to the United States. Putin in November 2001 reiterated the allegedly genuinely altruistic 
nature of Russia’s cooperation in the Global War on Terror: “Russia is not expecting any 
preferences or any payment for its position for the support of your country in combating 
terrorism.”74  Baker and Glasser contend that Russia’s continued cooperation hinged on 
the United States “returning the favor,” to include additional foreign investment, repeal of 
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the Jackson-Vanik trade amendment, debt forgiveness, WTO entry, delayed or halted 
NATO expansion if not even Russian admittance into the alliance, mutually acceptable 
accords on the ABM treaty and BMD, and a cessation of Western criticism of Russian 
actions in Chechnya and the implicit recognition by America the Chechnya was indeed a 
front within the larger Global War on Terror.75  Putin, in effect, wanted total Russian 
integration with the West.76   
What would happen if Putin’s desired integration and equal partnership with the 
United States and West failed to occur?  What if the unofficial score card continued to 
eschew in America’s favor?  Putin’s pre-held assumptions about perpetual U.S. 
exploitation of Russian weakness and treachery in the face of perceived Russian good 
will would soon have new supporting evidence, spurning a return to a default Putin, a 
Putin willing to publically demonstrate his anti-Americanism. As alluded to earlier, 
Vladimir Putin’s grade school teachers recognized his proclivity to harness long-lasting 
grudges over perceived betrayals of trust and loyalty. Putin in his autobiography 
personally details the “cruel but fair” treatment rendered upon one of his friends for not 
cooperating in pooling food money during a trip, only to be denied any food later.77  
Putin does not forgive those who do not cooperate, and his pre-disposed hostility toward 
America, though at best muted during the immediate 9/11 aftermath, would soon become 
patently obvious over the later phase of his first presidential term. An international 
friendship among two men would be tested and one man’s nation’s aspirations of 
integration with the west would be dashed. Putin’s inherent anti-Americanism would 
provide an excellent vehicle to demonstrate a new distancing of himself and Russian 
society from his short-lived friend: America. 
3. Brotherly Love: Putin and Bush 
Though Vladimir Putin rose to the Russian Presidency in the twilight of President 
Bill Clinton’s administration, the two world leaders never truly clicked. Mutual distrust 
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overshadowed all of their interactions. Baker and Glasser attribute much of Putin’s 
standoffishness to the perceived series of betrayals inflicted upon Russia by the United 
States during the 1990s, as discussed in previous sections.78  The Putin team was 
cautiously optimistic about starting a new relationship with the incoming Bush 
administration. Unfortunately, the only significant issue Bush wanted to address with 
Putin was American BMD development and the system’s incorporation within any 
renewal of the ABM treaty.79  Putin’s Kremlin, annoyed over such a narrow bilateral 
agenda, could only continue a non-productive but cordial relationship like that with 
Clinton. During their first bilateral summit in Slovenia in June 2001, Bush made his 
famous statement in which he “looked the man in the eye…found him to be very straight 
forward and… was able to get a sense of his soul.”  But substantive progress beyond 
international flattery was not to in the cards. Then 9/11 happened. 
In the aftermath of the Al Qaeda attacks, the bilateral relationship between the 
United States and Russia appeared to shift like few thought possible. Putin’s Russia, 
hoping to fully integrate with the Western community, initiated a series of policy actions 
as detailed previously. The relationship between Bush and Putin, too, flowered into 
something rarely-before seen on the global scene. Any semblance of anti-Americanism in 
Putin’s Kremlin, from Russia proper, and in most of the non-Muslim world seemed to 
subside. But global sympathy for the United States after the attacks remained temporary 
and largely superficial.80 Russia and the Kremlin were no different. America was still 
accruing a hefty tab in exchange for Putin’s and Russia’s ongoing cooperation. Desiring 
to be a true “strategic ally of the entire civilized community including the United States,” 
Putin in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks often made subtle jabs at the United States and 
Western world not only over admission of Chechnya within the Global War on Terror, 
but also for not fully integrating Russia earlier within anti-terror efforts and strategic 
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cooperation.81  Overshadowing Putin’s veiled prods, nevertheless, was a never ending 
oratory of praise and commendation toward George W. Bush, attributing the Russian-
American relationship to President Bush. Putin says he trusts Bush to live up to any 
promises made.82 Bush repeatedly reciprocates; the easing of tensions not just between 
the United States and Russia, but also NATO and Russia, is a “tribute” to Putin’s 
leadership; “Russia is our friend, not our enemy.”83  
Perhaps the most iconic images of the early friendship between the two presidents 
emanated from their November 2001 vacation at Bush’s Texas ranch. The developing 
relationship between the United States and Russia and Bush and Putin, according to 
Baker and Glasser, paralleled that between FDR and Churchill during World War II.84  
Such a relationship between two very different nations based on trust, cooperation, and 
information sharing between their two respective leaders could only persist if both 
leaders remained loyal to the relationship. As we shall see, the United States largely 
failed to live up to Putin’s reciprocity expectations; the U.S.-Russian tab would never be 
repaid, and Putin’s default state of acrimony toward America would return; anti-
Americanism in Russia and from Putin was about to become much more apparent; the 
hibernation was over. 
4. Iraq and a Sudden Turn Against America? 
According to Dmitri Trenin, Putin’s flirtation with a full Russian integration with 
America and the West was, at best, short lived. Within a year of 9/11, as Bush and 
Putin’s friendship reached new bounds, Putin’s subsequent efforts for an even greater 
strategic alignment met a cold shoulder as Bush and America shifted focus to a potential 
military strike upon Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.85  Vocally opposed to military strikes 
against Iraq as early as November 2001, Putin asserts the world’s efforts must be in 
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peacefully resuming U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq, and that bombing would solve 
nothing, sentiments he continued to echo into late 2002 at meetings between himself and 
Bush.86  Putin’s failure to influence American decision-making over the Iraq invasion 
was not the sole reason for renewed Putinist anti-American displays.  
As the U.S. attack grew imminent, Putin’s rhetoric changed into outright 
denouncement of any unilateral action against Iraq: “we believe that the use of force, 
especially unilateral use of force, is absolutely inadmissible.”  He further warned that the 
U.S. attack on Iraq could negatively affect the cohesion of the global coalition fighting 
terrorism.87  Putin’s continual admonition of any non-U.N. mandated (i.e. Putin 
authorized) use of force in Iraq grew more heated after meeting with French and German 
leaders in February 2003, saying any attack would be a “grave error,” even alluding to a 
multipolar division of the world with the United States on one side and Russia and 
Europe on the other.88  
In the aftermath of the invasion, Putin’s rhetoric hardened even further, 
aggressively denouncing America’s non-internationally mandated use force as a “law of 
the fist.”89   As he had been preaching in the run-up to the war, Putin repeatedly 
denounced any affront to the U.N’s primary role in international disputes, a body that 
Russia has considerable leverage in: “the central role in resolving the crisis situations in 
the world, including the situation around Iraq, must belong to the U.N. security 
council.”90  Rather unsubtly, Putin intimates that Russia should have a say in any use of 
force around the globe. Within a month of the invasion, Putin condemned the United 
States for the ongoing security and humanitarian crisis in Iraq, as well as the illegitimacy 
of the invasion given the fact that no weapons of mass destruction had been uncovered. 
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He also alludes to a dangerous new 21st century “colonialism” regarding the U.S. mission 
in Iraq as well as the futility of “exporting a capitalist, democratic revolution.”91     
Though Putin was not hesitant to show his public opposition to America’s war 
against Iraq, he never backed away from continually emphasizing his good relationship 
with President Bush, which he reiterated again, and again, and again while promising 
continued cooperation with Russia’s “American friends” on issues of mutual 
importance.92  But those issues of mutual importance were becoming fewer and fewer. 
Putin’s Kremlin initially silenced overly-critical media reports and anti-American dissent 
by Russian government officials over the Iraq war because, as Baker and Glasser 
contend, Putin was not willing to permanently ruin his relationship with Bush over Iraq, 
which Putin deemed a “distraction.”93   
As recently as December 2012, Putin credited the U.S.-Russian rift over Iraq as 
the turning point in bilateral relations “which then soured and deteriorated.”94  But in 
reality, the United States and George W. Bush had, in Putin’s mind, not effectively 
reciprocated Russia’s shows of support after 9/11. The attack on Iraq and the sidestepping 
of international jurisdiction (i.e. Russian sway) that it epitomized represented only one 
instance thereof. Bush had promised to work with Congress in repealing the Jackson-
Vanik trade restrictions.95  The amendment remained. Trade negotiations between the 
two states had resorted to a climate of eye-for-an-eye, with Bush implementing steel 
tariffs and Putin responding with poultry embargos, claiming America was intentionally 
selling Russians tainted chicken.96  NATO expansion further into Eastern Europe was all-
but-inevitable. The new NATO-Russia Council, or NRC, failed to live up to Putin’s 
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expectations, and subtle demands, of partnership based on equality. The Russian 
delegation was still not given universal access, could be barred from any discussions at 
the request of any member, and routinely faced an already backroom-orchestrated and 
united NATO-member coalition before the NRC convened.97 Increases in U.S. economic 
development aid to Russia were not forthcoming. American BMD development 
proceeded. Russia, and Putin, found themselves shut-out of the much-desired integration 
with the West. Putin had been snubbed by the United States, and as we have seen, 
perceived disloyalty and a refusal to cooperate are not easily forgotten by Vladimir Putin. 
Putin’s and Russia’s anti-American animosity, temporarily subsided or hidden in the 9/11 
aftermath, was returning and Iraq was only one of many straws that broke that camel’s 
back, though the most visible and therefore most publically exploitable.   
5. Elections of 2003 and 2004 
America became ever-more bogged down in Iraq and U.S.-Russian bilateral 
relations seemed at loggerheads over a host of issues, but cordiality remained owing to 
the continued friendship of Bush and Putin. That friendship seemed to return to pre-Iraq 
war levels by the autumn of 2003, where Bush and Putin again met at Camp David. Bush 
praised Putin for his management of Russian democracy and society, a practical 
endorsement of Putin’s re-election, though seemingly ignorant of the reality of Putin’s 
regime, according to Baker and Glasser.98  Elections in Russia for the Duma and 
President occurred at the end of 2003 and early 2004, respectively. Much more detail 
shall be offered over the nature and intricacies of Russian elections in Chapter III. Suffice 
it to say, anti-Western politicians and leaders, according to Stephen Wegren and Dale 
Herspring, had largely lay “dormant” during the Yeltsin years, only to be re-awakened 
during the Putin years.99  A growing chorus of Russian politicians, silenced by Putin’s 
Kremlin during the run-up to and invasion of Iraq, had become increasingly more critical 
                                                 
97 Weber, Sperling, and Smith, NATO’s Post-Cold War Trajectory: Decline or Regeneration?, 135. 
98 Baker and Glasser, Kremlin Rising, 230. 
99 Stephen Wegren and Dale Herspring, “Conclusion,” in After Putin’s Russia, ed Stephen Wegren 
and Dale Herspring, (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 296. 
 38 
of America as election season dawned, and Putin and his Kremlin machine did not strive 
to silence them anymore.   
Putin’s campaign rhetoric largely refrained from overt anti-Americanism, instead 
emphasizing domestic concerns with only subtle references to U.S. efforts to “increase 
their zones of strategic influence” by use of military superiority.100  Putin’s inauguration 
speech makes no reference to the United States but rather lays down vague goals of a 
Russia “strengthening its positions in the international arena and capable of upholding, by 
peaceful means, its legitimate interests in the rapidly changing world.”101  Based on 
Putin’s statements, he no longer used rhetoric alluding to full integration with the West. 
He would rather seek a position of equality with the West and a resurgence of Russian 
influence in the world on par with that of the Soviet Union, rather than just being  
the United States’ and West’s junior partner. A “default…great power mentality” was 
surpassing any further integrationist visions.102  That default mentality, one harkening to 
Soviet times, implied a renewed global competition within a non-unipolar world. Putin’s 
Russia, therefore, would now have to distance itself from the United States and West as 
well as challenge the United States’ dominance on the global scene, a role that Putin and 
his cadre were well conditioned to perform due to their pre-disposed confrontational 
nature toward America and the West. Anti-American rhetoric and policy would help 
create the distance and also revive and or propogate anti-American animosity among the 
Russian society. Simultaneously, continued authoritarian reforms would help harden 
Putin’s control and restore Russian power. 
E. PUTIN’S SECOND PRESIDENCY 
Vladimir Putin coasted to re-election and a second presidential term in the spring 
of 2004 “aided” by his ever evolving authoritarian machine, which will be detailed in 
Chapter III. Suffice it to say, during Putin’s first term, Russia had experienced an 
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economic and political stabilization, reversing many of the destructive trends of the 
Yeltsin era. Russia was stronger with Putin at the helm than at any time since the Cold 
War. Putinist anti-Americanism had been sparse and rarely observed during his first years 
in office, but still an underlying critical element of his mentality. It was simply sent into 
temporary hibernation in the wake of 9/11. But Russian bears always awake from 
hibernation eventually. Putin’s second term would bear witness to an ever-more obvious 
trend: a revival of anti-Americanism across the spectrum of Russian society, led by a pre-
disposed anti-American Russian President now even more embittered over the perceived 
slighting wrought upon him by the United States and her allies in the wake of proclaimed 
Russian altruism after 9/11. Events in U.S.-Russian relations would provide the backdrop 
of this revival, but in reality would only be scapegoats to justify an animosity long-since 
entrenched but becoming increasingly politically expedient.  
1. Shift from the West 
Rooted in a hoped-for unprecedented bilateral relationship with the United States 
and President George W. Bush, Putin unsuccessfully attempted to fully integrate Russia 
with the West on the geostrategic level during his first term. In light of that failure and 
perceived shunning by the United States, Putin, according to Dmitri Trenin, lapsed into a 
“default option of behaving as an independent great power,” focusing on hegemonic 
influence in Eurasia and becoming or maintaining a position as one of several multipolar 
global power centers equal to the United States, Europe, and emerging China.103  No 
longer desiring full integration with the West, and with increased Russian material and 
economic power in his back pocket, in his second term, Putin could now embark on a 
much more assertive stance and foreign policy, especially toward the United States and 
West. He still stopped short of overt confrontation.104  Distancing himself from all things 
American and Western would necessitate attacking things deemed American and 
Western; anti-Americanism would be employed as a rallying cry to the Russian nation to 
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justify further distance between Russia and the nations they once sought to emulate. Putin 
renewed late-Yeltsin-era rhetoric, in which he claimed America and the West sought to 
keep Russia perpetually weak and dependent.105  To demonstrate Russia’s, and his own, 
independence and parity with the United States and the West, Putin employed 
increasingly critical anti-American oratory, backed by increasingly quarrelsome anti-
American policies. 
2. America Inadvertently Plays into Putin’s Hand 
The United States and its Western allies grew increasingly adept at providing the 
fodder to easily inflame the anti-Americanism of a paranoid Vladimir Putin, even though 
such fodder would appear benign by Western standards. Though most logical Western 
observers find it a scurrilous notion that there currently exists a U.S.-led global coalition 
to oust President Putin or destroy the Russian Federation, Putin possesses a Soviet-era 
KGB mentality and does truly believe such things. His anti-American cognitive pre-
disposition to view events and U.S. actions through the lens of natural American hostility 
toward himself and Russia would result in further mental self-justification for his 
entrenched anti-Americanism. As Robert Jervis notes, “people frequently fail to realize 
that evidence that is consistent with their hypothesis may also be consistent with other 
views” and they, therefore, “see evidence that conforms to their hypothesis as confirming 
it.”106  Putin would bear witness to events that started late in his first term that would 
seem to conform to his pre-disposed hypothesis: that America seeks a Russian collapse, 
whether through NATO, American unilateralism, ballistic missile defenses, western-
”instigated” upheaval on Russia’s near-abroad, or western meddling within Russia 
proper. Anti-American fears, thereby, were “confirmed” and could now be fully 
exploited, garnering political benefit. 
Fears of an American hegemon persisted to this day, twenty years after the Berlin 
Wall came crashing down. During Putin’s now infamous 2007 Munich speech, he 
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claimed to bear witnesses to a global environment that was increasingly aligning and 
conforming closer and closer to the United States’ interpretations of acceptable legal 
norms and perceptions of international law.107  And a fear of an American hegemon that 
once again dominated Europe became routinely employed in Kremlin talking points 
claiming that “Putin is the only leader left in Europe who has not been run over by a 
steamroller of American hegemony.”108  A former Russian NATO ambassador went so 
far as to claim that “Russia today faces dangers similar to those during the Russian 
Revolution and World War II.”109 The Russian Revolutionary threat he alludes to was 
that of internal civil war and insurrection within the fledgling Bolshevik state by anti-
Bolshevik White forces with Western backing. The World War II threat represents a 
massive invasion or geopolitical encirclement by potentially hostile entities, namely Nazi 
Germany (and Imperial Japan).   
a. NATO 
A U.S.-led European based threat emerged to seemingly threaten Russia 
with just such an encroachment/encirclement: NATO. Vladimir Putin publically referred 
to ongoing NATO expansion into Eastern Europe as a “serious provocation,” specifically 
citing NATO and U.S. frontline bases in close proximity to the Russian territory.110  The 
Berlin Wall in Putin’s mind, therefore, may have simply been transplanted to the new 
NATO eastern border of the former Warsaw Pact states, in effect creating another 
dividing line. He further denounces NATO expansion as unnecessary and 
counterproductive to combatting the current global threats of terrorism.111  In 2005, given 
the Baltic States’ recent admittance to the alliance, Putin issued veiled warnings toward 
those nations about respecting the rights of ethnic Russians, inferring consequences from 
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Russia if such demands were not adhered to.112  Taken at face value, Putin threatened 
Russian military intervention in the Baltics under the guise of protecting the Russian 
ethnic minorities. And the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO in the aftermath of the 
Orange revolution drew an equally hostile threat from Putin. In 2008 he threatened the 
retargeting of Russian ICBMs against Ukraine should they join the alliance.113  
  Putin’s regime did not protest the establishment of U.S. military bases in 
Central Asia after the 9/11 attacks.114  Those bases, nevertheless, in conjunction with the 
new eastern “border” of NATO can be construed by Putin as something akin to the start 
of a territorial encirclement. Regarding NATO, or any Western-coalition-based 
organization (ie: European Union), Putin declared it unjust for any pre-emptive military 
action to occur against a sovereign state without the United Nation’s consent, a body that 
Russia has considerable leverage in.  “The use of force can only be considered legitimate 
if the decision is sanctioned by the U.N. And we do not need to substitute NATO or the 
EU for the U.N.”115  As he had unsubtly intimated for years, Putin once again exhorts 
that Russia should have an input on any military action by any party on planet Earth. 
b. The Future of U.S. Unilateralism 
NATO use of force pales in comparison to perceptions of United States’ 
unilateralism in fomenting anti-American hatred within Putin’s Kremlin. Putin exhorted 
that unilateral uses of force have failed to alleviate any geostrategic problems and “have 
caused new human tragedies and created new centers of tension.”116  Without a doubt, 
Putin alluded to Iraq and more broadly to most U.S. actions under the Global War on 
Terror umbrella. He initially condemned America’s resorting to a “rule of the fist” by 
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attacking Iraq and thereby violating the principles of state sovereignty.117  He would 
continue to criticize the anarchic security, political, and humanitarian situation in Iraq in 
the years after the initial assault, again denouncing America’s perceived attempt to export 
Western democracy and the lack of WMDs uncovered.118   
As the international community braced for what seemed like another U.S. 
strike, this time against Iran, Putin, in 2007, went so far as to accuse unnamed peoples 
within the U.S. administration and intelligence community of being pathological liars 
regarding alleged intelligence proof of Iranian nuclear development.119  Putin would, 
nevertheless, continue to emphasize his wonderful relationship with George W. Bush, 
even as their two respective countries butted heads increasingly frequently on a host of 
issues. Putin still referred to Bush as a “reliable and consistent person,” a “reliable 
partner” and “man of honor.”120  Putin’s vocal anti-Americanism had not yet become 
parallel anti-Bushism, though he outwardly attacked most actions made by the Bush 
administration. 
c. BMD  
Once the pre-eminent issue of U.S.-Russian bilateral relations before 9/11, 
Vladimir Putin’s hostility toward further American BMD development would reach fever 
pitch, returning this issue to the forefront in U.S.-Russian affairs. Putin remained 
cognitively convinced that the United States was willing to engage in overt pre-emptive 
military action, like in Iraq. Combined with the presumption that America remains the 
prime orchestrator within NATO, such a superior conventional military juggernaut poses 
a serious threat to the security of the Russian state. Only Russia’s nuclear deterrent 
represents an effective counter. Given such culminating paranoia, it is easy to understand 
Putin’s apprehension about a U.S. sponsored ballistic missile defense system in NATO 
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Europe and why American insistence on it only endorses his anti-American cognitive 
pre-disposition: an inherently antagonistic America. Today, as during the turbulent 
1990s, Putin firmly believes that Russia’s strategic deterrent capability “enabled us to 
maintain our national sovereignty.”121  By refusing to accept Iran as possessing a viable 
missile threat to Europe, he diplomatically questions the necessity of such a European 
missile shield, claiming its deployment could trigger another unwanted geopolitically 
destabilizing arms race. Russia would then be required to further develop an asymmetric, 
more cost-effective counter to the American missile shield, namely improved missile 
capability. Meanwhile, he publically acknowledges that the U.S. missile shield and 
Russia’s new Topol-M missile systems are not directed toward Russian and U.S. forces 
respectively.122  Putin re-iterates that American deployment of an arsenal of such 
“destabilizing weapons” harkens back to a previously abandoned “old bloc mentality” 
during an “era of global confrontation.”123 
His perception of the actual BMD threat results directly from his cognitive 
predisposition toward the United States: they cannot be trusted and are inherently hostile 
to Russia. Russia’s military intelligence network is predisposed to provide worst-case 
scenario analysis; its military high command is predisposed to employ such biased 
analysis as justification for increased defense spending. It is, therefore, understandable 
why Putin’s Kremlin’s official concern regarding a U.S. missile shield is that it is 
designed to nullify Russia’s nuclear deterrent against any pre-emptive American/NATO 
nuclear or conventional strike, making Russia a potential victim of “military 
blackmail.”124  More realistic calculations of actual U.S. military capability have long 
been offered by the Russian (and Soviet) diplomatic corps.125 Putin, as the sole 
                                                 
121 Vladimir Putin, “Being strong: National security guarantees for Russia,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 
February 20, 2012. 
122 Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy.” 
123 Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,” May 10, 
2006, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches.shtml. 
124 Mikhail Tsypkin, “Russia, America and Missile Defense,” Defense and Security Analysis 28, no. 1 
(March 2012), 56–58. 
125 Mikhail Tsypkin, “Russian politics, policy-making and American missile defense,” International 
Affairs 85, no. 4 (2009): 788. 
 45 
orchestrator of state foreign policy, nevertheless, prefers to adhere to intelligence 
estimates that conform to his cognitive predispositions and thereby provide additional 
fodder to fuel his and his nation’s anti-Americanism.         
d. Western Turn by Former Constituent States 
The Kremlin’s strategic insecurity and anti-American fears of a 
U.S/Western coalition encroaching upon Russian sovereignty were only exacerbated 
during the color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine and those countries’ subsequent 
rapprochement toward the West and ongoing petitions to join NATO.126  The United 
States was already engaged in arms sales to former Soviet states with histories of anti-
Russianism, like Georgia and Azerbaijan, which Putin’s Kremlin deems provocative and 
potentially destabilizing.127  So a U.S- led NATO military alliance between Ukraine and 
Georgia would effectively complete the perceived territorial encirclement of the Russian 
Federation. The color revolutions, starting with the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, 
the Orange rendition in Ukraine in late 2004, and the Tulip version in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 
were all perpetrated by the United States, or so alleged Vladimir Putin.128  Just as the 
west attempted to interfere in the Bolshevik revolution, if the United States can 
orchestrate the ouster of Russian-friendly governments in those states, Putin remains 
psychologically convinced that America and its grand coalition will attempt to oust him 
from leadership as well, thereby further legitimizing and confirming his historical anti-
Americanism. 
In 2004, in the midst of the color revolutionary epoch, Putin makes 
reference to non-political organizations within Russia with ties to foreign states or 
interests inherently unfriendly to Russia and its people. He also echoed the need for a 
strong and modernized military to protect the state from external military aggression, but 
now including external political pressure as well.129  In 2006, he intimated that without 
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drastic military improvements and expenditures, a “wolf” (i.e., the United States) could 
easily “eat” Russia up based on the disparity in defense spending between the two 
states.130  By 2007, he overtly accuses an “influx of money from abroad being used to 
intervene directly in our internal affairs,” a modern day imperialist bent under the guise 
of “democratization…to ensure unilateral gains and one’s own advantage.”131  The “one” 
he alludes to is the United States. Such remarks play upon the historical fears of Russians 
toward external enemies. Putin’s employment of anti-Americanism in his domestic realm 
was taking shape.  
3. Critical Reciprocity?  Attack on Those who Criticize Him 
Putin also stepped up his retaliatory rhetoric against those who would criticize a 
plethora of aspects of his emerging Russian society. Putin became increasingly defensive 
about international criticism of his handling of domestic affairs and the nature of his 
regime. Insidious to Putin were American criticisms of Russia’s positions on civil 
liberties under the auspices of questions concerning free-market and free trade 
economics. Putin rails against Western assertions that foreign companies were not given 
due rights to Russian energy resources and markets, and that Russia was the butt of too 
much criticism regarding their laws on free speech and equal rights during their WTO 
accession proceedings.132   
With the ongoing criticism of Russian domestic culture as somehow less-than-
democratic compared to the allegedly superior democratic systems in America and 
Europe, Putin was forced to respond. Putin loathes the notion that Russia must constantly 
be “taught about democracy,” and therefore equally criticizes over-inflated examples of 
supposed undemocratic policies in the west.133  He cites the U.S. electoral college as 
undemocratic compared to his elections by direct popular vote, using the 2000 U.S. 
Supreme Court Bush vs. Gore ruling as evidence of the imperfect nature of American 
                                                 
130 Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,” May 10, 2006. 
131 Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,” April 26, 
2007, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches.shtml. 
132 Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy.” 
133 Ibid. 
 47 
democracy.134  Those with imperfect democracies, by his reckoning, have no right to 
criticize Russian democracy.  
To those who criticize Russian human rights abuses, he also preaches the alleged 
hypocrisy of the United States and West. Regarding Russian persecution of free 
journalists, Putin alleges that anti-Bush American journalists and those opposed to the 
Iraq war were fired for their positions and election coverage, referring to Dan Rather of 
CBS.135  He also exploits U.S. human rights violations, specifically prisoner detainees 
and interrogation or torture scandals. These instances are utilized within the context of 
broader U.S. counterterrorism policies, which all became extremely unpopular in 
Russia.136  Putin’s domestic audience had grown increasingly worried about American 
actions in recent years, allowing Putin to exploit those concerns by trumping up more 
evidence of American impropriety, all with an obvious anti-American flavor. 
Toward the end of Putin’s second term, the vociferousness of his anti-
Americanism could be seen. Blame or culpability on a host of issues was being leveled 
toward the United States, the West, and their supposed proxies within Russia. Continual 
criticism of his regime and Russian society from the United States had become, according 
to Putin, the main problem in Russian-American relations.137  Such criticism, deemed 
unfounded by Putin, was allegedly being orchestrated by those in power in the United 
States to negatively alter the American and global public’s impression of Russia so as to 
gain increased geopolitical leverage, though once again he refrains from directly accusing 
his “friend” President Bush.138  In turn, anti-American criticism from Putin could be seen 
has having a direct effect on his public’s perceptions of America. As we shall see in the 
subsequent chapter, a government’s manipulation of public opinion is not an alien notion 
to Vladimir Putin. Putin’s constitutional hold on the Russian Presidency, however, was 
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coming to an end, albeit temporarily. His hold on Russia itself, however, would continue 
along with his newfound, or more appropriately, resurfaced anti-Americanism.   
F. PRESIDENT TO PUPPETMASTER AND BACK AGAIN: PUTIN’S 
RECENT PREMIERSHIP AND RETURN TO THE PRESIDENCY 
Vladimir Putin, in accordance with the Russian constitution, did not pursue 
election to a third consecutive term in 20008, preferring instead to become Prime 
Minister under his handpicked presidential successor, Dmitri Medvedev. Though 
officially removed from supreme executive power in the Russian Federation, Putin’s 
supervision of the regime structure that he created remained uninterrupted; this so-called 
tandem relationship between Putin and Medvedev shall be further detailed in Chapter III. 
Under the Russian constitution, the President, as head of state, is responsible for the 
conduct of foreign affairs and international relations, a principle that Putin vehemently 
defended when challenged by outside entities claiming he was still orchestrating all 
foreign and defense policy as Prime Minister.139  Prime Minister Putin, constitutionally 
resigned to matters of the domestic government, nevertheless, did not refrain from public 
or private participation in such issues, even if claiming all decisions were made by 
Medvedev. Putin’s anti-American trend during his second term would transcend his short 
time as Prime Minister, and continue practically unabated during Medvedev’s 
administration and into Putin’s third presidential term in 2012. A new American 
President Barack Obama, with President Medvedev, would attempt a famous “reset” in 
bilateral relations that had been spoiled over the previous four years, but as we shall 
witness, that “reset” proved tenuous. 
1. Georgia 
Less than six months into what many in the world hoped would be a new Russia 
under Dmitri Medvedev, military conflict broke out between Russia and the pro-Western 
former Soviet Republic of Georgia over Georgia’s separatist region of South Ossetia. The 
intricacies of the so called Five Day War in August 2008 and questions of “who 
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provoked who” are beyond the scope of this thesis. Needless to say, the fighting was 
brutal and a full-scale Russian invasion of Georgia ensued. Putin attributed sole authority 
for the decision to deploy Russian forces on President Medvedev and adamantly blamed 
Georgia and Georgian President Saakashvili for the “criminal actions” that precipitated 
the conflict.140  Saakashvili, hoping for U.S. and European assistance in the conflict, 
never got it. The absence of overt American military intervention with Georgia, however, 
did not stop Putin from leveling blame upon the United States and President Bush for 
failing to “stop the aggressive actions of the Georgian leadership;” he also alleged covert 
U.S. presence orchestrated the Georgian military’s actions, issues that Putin also asserted 
could irreparably damage his personal relationship with Bush.141  Putin even went so far 
as to charge the American government of secretly prodding the Georgians to create a 
destabilizing situation in the international scene that could inherently benefit one of the 
U.S. Presidential candidates during the final months of the 2008 campaign, namely 
Senator John McCain.142  
In the aftermath of the conflict, as a ceasefire took effect with Russian 
“peacekeeping” forces remaining in South Ossetia (and Abkhazia), the Medvedev 
government formally recognized the independence of the two breakaway regions. The 
United States and West condemned such action and refused to reciprocate, claiming both 
must be re-incorporated into Georgia. America and the Western powers recognized 
Kosovar independence from Yugoslavia quickly after that war. It remains hypocritical, 
according to Putin, for them to not do the same for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, who 
desire the same independence after allegedly suffering under Georgian leadership as the 
Kosovar Albanians had under the Serbs.143  The Georgian conflict, thereby, provided an 
excellent environment for Putin to continue his anti-American attacks upon the United 
States early in his tenancy as Prime Minister, another example of perceived American 






aggression toward Russia that could be easily seen by Putin’s domestic populace, as they 
remained fixated upon events transpiring right on their own border. 
2. The Obama-Medvedev Reset: Short Lived or DOA? 
The inauguration of President Barack Obama to succeed George W. Bush, in 
conjunction with a new Russian President Medvedev, brought renewed hope for a 
warming in U.S.-Russian bilateral relations: a much sought-after “reset.”  Medvedev 
himself proclaimed “positive relations with the new Administration: personally…with 
President Obama and other officials’ and ministers’ with their American counterparts.”  
He further intimated that such relationships did not exist during the “previous 
Administration during its last years.”144  The crowning achievements between the United 
States and Russia due to the “reset,” according to the Congressional Research Service 
were the 2010 New START treaty, 2010 cooperation on new sanctions against Iran, 
Russia’s membership in the WTO in 2012, and ongoing Russian assistance with the 
Afghan War.145 Putin, too, in 2010, commended Obama and hailed the recent subsiding 
of anti-Russian rhetoric from the United States government.146   
Putin, however, did not stop his anti-American rhetoric toward the United States, 
even if they were slightly and temporarily more muted. He still blamed narrow minded 
influence seekers in the U.S. for the yet-repealed Jackson-Vanik trade amendment as well 
as Russia’s longer-than average WTO admittance process.147  He hostilely rebuked 
ongoing American criticisms of Russian democracy, again alleging the un-democratic 
nature of the U.S. electoral college. He asserted that U.S. and foreign involvement in 
Russia’s internal affairs, as such foreign criticism of the regime is considered, is as 
unwelcome as foreign involvement in American internal affairs would be to 
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Americans.148  In response to the 2010 arrests of Russian sleeper-agents and extradition 
to Russia and Russian reciprocal expulsion of alleged U.S. spies, Putin was quite blasé on 
the matter; he emphasized that the agents’ roles were not subversive while less-than-
subtly pointing fingers at U.S. intelligences’ role in human right’s abuses within the 
Global War on Terror, including the condoning of torture, kidnapping, and secret 
prisons.149  Putin decided to show ignorance over the (then) current events to publically 
focus on some obfuscated coincidence more congruent to the proliferation of his and his 
country’s anti-American sentiments.   
Therefore, though relations between the United States and “Medvedev’s” Russia 
may have appeared better than the later years of Putin’s second term, Putin still remained 
in the background (or foreground?). His inevitable return to the presidency in 2012 
brought with it a resumption of overt anti-American hostility as if he had never left power 
to begin with, which, as we shall see, he did not. 
3. The 2012 Election and Putin’s Third Term 
Duma elections were held in Russia in later 2011, followed by the Presidential 
elections in the spring of 2012, in which Vladimir Putin was (re)elected to a third full 
term as head of state. Putin’s political party United Russia also won substantial majorities 
in the Duma. In the aftermath of the Duma elections, whose fraudulent nature shall be 
discussed in Chapter III, waves of public protests erupted in Moscow and other urban 
centers. The protest movement, the largest yet witnessed in Putin’s Russia, had been 
fanned by social media and allegations that the election was a rigged farce. The public 
movement, however, failed to put forward any galvanizing personality capable of uniting 
the angry mobs and capitalizing on their disenchantment.150  Putin, as Prime Minister and 
Presidential “candidate,” quickly denounced the protests, firmly believing that they had 
been organized and funded by the United States and the West to remove his regime from 
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power just like had been, allegedly, done in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution.151  
He was once again playing on Russians’ natural fears of outside coercion, trying to 
propagate his anti-American belief that the United States means him (and thereby Russia) 
harm, compelling the populace to rally around him in defense from the outsiders (i.e., the 
protesters). Putin’s 2012 campaign became laden with anti-American rhetoric. He 
accused his rivals for the presidency of being “U.S. lackeys;” opposition protesters were 
“puppets” of the CIA and the American government while a marked increase in anti-
American news stories flooded the state-run (and thereby Putin-controlled) media’s 
airwaves.152 
After Putin’s inevitable victory, there remained hope for a return to more 
tempered relations between America and Russia once the campaign rhetoric died down. 
But Putin’s attacks would not cease. Firmly believing the U.S. and her allies orchestrated 
the 2011–2012 anti-government protests in Russia in an attempt to bring down Putin’s 
regime, Putin implemented strict guidelines for the operation and funding of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) within the Russian Federation. He claimed that 
foreign funded NGOs are used to “support extremism” and that they thereby “inevitably 
serve the interests of others.”153  The others that Putin refers to are the United States and 
its allies, which is why the American USAID organization was harshly targeted.154  By 
citing U.S. and OSCE originated funding for independent election monitoring groups 
during the 2012 election, such groups purportedly funneled money to Internet sites 
designed to discredit the Russian government and organize the mass protests. Such 
foreign money used in political campaigns, he asserts, represents an affront to democracy 
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and simply a veiled attempt by one state “exerting influence on another” thereby 
threating a state’s sovereignty.155 
Putin’s defensiveness about international criticism of his handling of domestic 
affairs came to a boil after his election victory. Overly-defensive people have a tendency 
to over-react, as was the case in his response to the December 2012 Magnitsky Law in 
the United States, which passed in conjunction with Putin’s long awaited repeal of the 
Jackson-Vanik trade amendment. The Magnitsky provisions prohibited U.S. visas and 
banking access to certain Russian officials deemed responsible for the death of Sergei 
Magnitsky who was jailed after investigating tax corruption. A foreign state attempting to 
punish Russians accused of human rights violations could not go unanswered by Putin. 
The measure only further inflamed his hostile anti-Americanism. There was wide support 
for a copy-cat law directed against U.S. officials, but they instead banned U.S. adoptions 
of Russian children after Putin’s state media successfully over exaggerated the 
circumstances surrounding a single death of a Russian baby in the United States. Putin 
claimed that U.S. criticism over the death of Magnistky was only used as a pretext to 
initiate a new anti-Russian law to replace the expiring Cold-War era anti-Soviet Jackson-
Vanik law. He further obfuscated the issue by citing deaths in U.S. jails and American 
hypocrisy due to “unlawful” seizures and imprisonment of peoples around the world.156  
Putin had resorted to anti-American attacks over seemingly miniscule events, all to 
perpetuate the narrative within the Kremlin and Russia of a United States using any 
means available to diminish Russia. 
The Magnitsky episode represents just one example of a Kremlin that feels 
incensed to counter every seemingly anti-Russian policy by the United States or even 
criticism by random minor-U.S. politicians, who still routinely refer to Russia as the 
Soviet Union. This shedds further light on the culture of anti-Americanism in Putin’s 
                                                 
155 Cullison, “Kremlin Resorts to Anti-Americanism;” Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at 
the Munich Conference on Security Policy.” 
156 Vladimir Putin, “News Conference of Vladimir Putin,” December 20, 2012, 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches.shtml. 
 54 
government.157  As recently as April 2013, after the United States barred travel of 18 
accused Russian human-rights violators, Putin responded in kind, barring 18 American 
officials from entering Russia. Putin’s government asserted that the 18 Americans were 
culpable in grievous global human rights violations like torture and unlimited detention 
of terror suspects. In reality, the Russian list was composed mostly of individuals 
involved in court cases against corrupt Russian officials.158  Vladimir Putin’s exploitation 
of alleged Western hostility toward Russian domestic affairs will continue to fuel his and, 
transitively, his public’s anti-Americanism until the United States and her allies 
effectively recant their criticisms of his regime. Putin’s own deputy chief of staff, Dmitry 
Peskov, has intimated as much: “the dialogue between the Russian government and the 
opposition cannot be a subject of the bilateral relationship between Moscow and 
Washington,…we are a country that will solve all the problems, domestic and the like, 
without any interference from abroad.”159 
When asked about the need to “reset” relations once again between the United 
States and Russia, Putin resorts to a seemingly school-yard mentality: “if we are slapped, 
we must retaliate, otherwise we will always be taken advantage of.”160  A tit-for-tat 
relationship between two world powers is unlikely to result in any return to a rapport of 
mutual trust.  
4. Ongoing Events 
The most recent several months while writing this thesis has borne witness to a 
seemingly never-ending series of events pertinent to the topics of our discussion: Syria, 
the Boston Marathon Bombings, Edward Snowden, and ongoing tension between the 
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Obama and Putin governments to name a few. As most such recent events remain 
ongoing, any thorough academic analysis of them here shall remain mostly conjecture. 
Suffice it to say, events during this most recent year have provided additional fodder to 
fuel Putin’s seemingly never-ending anti-American propaganda machine toward his 
populace. 
Vladimir Putin’s position regarding Syria has changed little in the course of the 
multi-year civil war. On the prospect of a regime change, Putin condemns America’s and 
the West’s horrible track record of post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
now Libya. He accuses the United States of aiding terrorists (i.e., the Syrian opposition) 
just like America did in the 1980s in Afghanistan, rebels who eventually became Al 
Qaeda.161  He routinely blasted the United States and West for reneging on Russian-
orchestrated peace frameworks while justifying Russian arms sales to the Assad 
government because the Assad government is the current legitimate government of Syria 
and international norms prohibit arms supplies to recognized rebel groups seeking regime 
change through military conflict in any state.162  As an American military attack against 
Assad for chemical weapon’s use seemed eminent, Putin echoed his previous 
consternations in an op-ed for the New York Times, touting the illegitimate nature of U.S. 
unilateralism over the previous decades in the face of the U.N. and international law and 
challenging any notion of American exceptionalism.163  His piece, suffice it to say, was 
not well received in the United States.  
In the aftermath of the Boston Marathon Bombings by two men with ties to the 
Russian Caucuses, Putin again emphasized his decade-long talking points referring to 
Russia as one of the “earliest victims” of international terrorism. He intimated that U.S. 
authorities failed to adhere to Russian warnings about the individuals and future complete 
cooperation between the two states on anti-terror intelligence would stop all such attacks. 
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He then resorted to scolding American and Western media who routinely refer to 
Caucuses-originated attacks on Russia as the actions of “insurgents” rather than terrorists, 
even claiming American and Western financing of such terrorists in the South 
Caucuses.164  
The soap-opera-like sage of famed NSA leaker Edward Snowden is likely to have 
ramifications well beyond his recent receiving of temporary asylum in Russia. President 
Obama subsequently cancelled a bilateral meeting between himself and Putin, though 
there was largely little to discuss between the two men even before the Snowden 
affair.165  Regardless, Putin granting Snowden asylum was the perfect snub of America: 
it would be embarrassing to the United States; public opinion in Russia was on his side; 
U.S. adversaries loved Snowden for exposing alleged American imperialism; Putin could 
exploit the incident within the context of U.S.-Russian bickering regarding human 
rights.166   
With Snowden fresh on the mind and Syria as an elephant in the room, there 
should have been little surprise that the G20 Summit in St. Petersburg in September 2013 
included very little in the way of meetings between U.S. and Russian officials beyond the 
obligatory photo-ops. There has been renewed international cooperation on the issue of 
Syrian chemical weapons, but such collaboration between the United States and Russia is 
unlikely to bring a sudden thawing in the otherwise frosty relationship. Putinist anti-
Americanism is liable to continue for the duration of Putin’s third term (and fourth and 
fifth and sixth…?) because as we have seen (1) it never truly left, and as we will see (2) it 
has become a necessity in Putin’s political calculus.  
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G. CONCLUSIONS 
In writing their book Anti-Americanism in Russia from Stalin to Putin, published 
in 2000, Eric Shiraev and Vladislav Zubok offered what, in hindsight, proved to be a very 
astute set of prognostications. As Putin had just come to power, Shiraev and Zubok 
believed one of three outcomes would transpire in the subsequent years: (1) Putin would 
remove all opposition to his rule and become a complete authoritarian within the 
constitutional framework and not employ rampant anti-Americanism, or (2) he would 
become a modern strong-man, forever harboring underlying anti-American sentiments, a 
KGB mentality, and fear of perceived American pressure upon him, resulting in perpetual 
tensions between the U.S. and Russia and spurning a routine usage of anti-Americanism 
within his domestic sphere, or (3) Putin’s leadership would fail and his personal opinion 
of the United States would be irrelevant while under constant attack from the political 
opposition destined to marginalize the position of the Russian Presidency.167  
Their second prediction seems to have come to near complete fruition. As will be 
discussed in Chapter III, the notion that Putin’s regime has become completely 
authoritarian as portrayed in the first theory remains misguided. Putin has obviously not 
failed to secure his power-position as alluded to in theory three.   
Based on the preceding sections, Putin’s anti-Americanism is rooted in his life 
experiences before his sudden rise to national prominence. He grew up within an anti-
Western Soviet Union; he attended a university and law school taught by fervent anti-
Western communists; he worked for years within the KGB, an organization designed, 
among other functions, to combat anti-Soviet and pro-American/Western ideology. 
Before the Berlin Wall came down and the Red Flag was removed from atop the 
Kremlin, Vladimir Putin had likely developed a severe cognitive pre-disposition, an anti-
Americanism to be precise. Based on Robert Jervis’s four variables to determine the 
strength of one’s cognitive pre-disposition, the Cold War and Putin’s service within the 
Soviet machine would have had a long-lasting and permanent effect on his psyche and 
perception toward the United States.   
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Jervis further writes that “because of their predispositions, they see the present as 
like recent and dramatic events without carefully considering alternative models or the 
implications of this way of perceiving.”168  Putin, thereby, equates current and recent 
American actions as analogous to past American actions. The United States sought to 
undermine the Soviet Union during the Cold War and proceeded to a perceived routine 
snubbing of Yeltsin’s Russia during the 1990s where the United States allegedly sought 
to exploit Russian weaknesses. Muffled in the early 2000s and in the aftermath of 9/11, 
Vladimir Putin’s anti-Americanism could best be described as fluctuating in its outward 
portrayal but consistently a factor within his internal psychological/cognitive 
calculations. It was always there and always will be there, even if the level of 
vociferousness alters between a whisper and a shout. Muted in an attempt to cozy to 
George W. Bush, Putin turned up his anti-American volume again when overtures for 
Russian integration with the Western world were perceived to have been met with 
perpetual acrimony from the United States and West. Ole Holsti, in his book To See 
Ourselves as Others See Us: How Publics Abroad View the United States after 9/11, 
reiterates that American actions and policy after the September 2001 attacks became the 
primary driving force behind growing anti-Americanism worldwide.169  Putin has 
witnessed American actions of late as further evidence proving his cognitive pre-
dispositions toward an inherently hostile America, thereby further justifying his anti-
Americanism. Holsti would concur with such an assessment, holding that people and 
governments around the world tend to interpret American actions in any way to sustain 
their entrenched pre-conceptions.170 
Andrei Tsygankov contends that Putin’s post-Iraq War foreign policy and stance 
toward the United States are more assertive and contentious because Russian 
contemporary and domestic interests are perceived to be best served as such.171  Other 
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contemporary observers would agree based on just what U.S. and Russian interests truly 
were, are, and will be. At the time of the Iraq War, Russia simply no longer held a 
strategically important place in U.S. foreign policy; the two states simply do not 
overwhelmingly need eachother for anything in the geopolitical realm anymore; they are 
economically mutually-dispensable and they should not fear a nuclear holocaust between 
themselves as in Soviet times.172  Putin’s anti-Americanism, by these accounts, may 
therefore not be as perpetually endogenous as this thesis contends. 
If one considers the cognitive pre-disposition theory of Robert Jervis, 
nevertheless, Vladimir Putin has been, is, and will be inherently anti-American. The anti-
Americanism of his past Soviet experience became ossified during his time between the 
communist collapse and his rise to power. While in power, his anti-American 
propensities returned to a discernible nature in conjunction within a few years in spite of, 
but not necessarily exclusively owing to the Iraq War. Putin’s inherent anti-Americanism 
manifested itself through an extended pattern of animosity in rhetoric and actions over 
the course of his presidencies, particularly acutely since 2003. According to Ivan Krastev: 
“anti-Americanism is a systemic opposition to America as a whole. It is a critique of the 
United States that transcends mere disagreement over specific policy questions or 
government decisions.”173  Putin’s anti-Americanism, as exemplified in this chapter, is 
not reduced to any isolated incident, but has become a pattern of general opposition to all 
things American. Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane would conclude that Putin has 
shown a consistent anti-American “attitude” that factors into any perceptions he has of 
the United States.174     
Increasingly fervent and vociferous, Putin’s anti-American guidance of Russia has 
aided in the frosting of what was, though short-lived, a seemingly warm bilateral 
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relationship between the two states. Subsequent Chapters shall provide evidence about 
the domestic political ramifications, and benefits, that Putin’s anti-Americanism has 
brought him within the government system that he created. As a closer look is taken into 
the mechanics of the Putinist regime and its role in Russian society, one must keep in the 










III. VLADIMIR PUTIN’S RUSSIA: BETWEEN DEMOCRACY 
AND DICATORSHIP? 
Chapter III will offer an overview of Putin’s hybrid authoritarian regime and what 
makes his Russia something less than an outright authoritative state, though far from a 
true democracy.    As such, a discussion will be offered on the elements of Putin’s Russia 
that remain or resemble a democracy and those elements that most certainly do not. I 
shall further detail the specific authoritarian mechanisms employed by the Putin regime 
to retain power and influence the nation as a whole regarding domestic issues and 
international relations. Such detail will provide a basis of understanding for Chapter IV 
which shall further examine such mechanisms’ use in manipulating Russians’ attitudes 
toward the United States. This chapter’s investigation will include a discussion of basic 
resource theory and how it is applied in Russia. This chapter shall also highlight how the 
Putinist regime’s resource control, like its control over the media, can help him 
manipulate public anti-American sentiments to suit his domestic political needs. 
Given Putin’s incomplete though extremely strong grip on power, an analysis of 
the role of the public and the elites within the Russian political sphere will also be 
offered. Is Putin beholden to either, neither, or both bases for support of his perpetual 
power-hold?  If his reign remains at the mercy of these groups, whether under remaining 
democratic auspices or threat of popular uprising, then Putin is obliged to employ 
whatever means available to maintain their “support,” to include authoritarian repression 
and falsely-democratic legitimation. Maintaining an anti-American mood in Russian 
society, like those sentiments he has harbored for so long, has become a prime means of 
maintaining that necessary level of “support.”  In order to examine how anti-
Americanism is necessary for those ends, this chapter will first explore why the autocrat 
Putin still needs popular and elitist support. To do that, an analysis of some of the 
mechanical idiosyncrasies of his regime’s general workings must also be explored. This 
chapter will provide a base of understanding of the authoritarian nature of Russian 
domestic governance for a subsequent interpretation of the integration of Putin’s anti-
Americanism with domestic politics. 
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A. WHAT MAKES AN AUTHORITARIAN STATE? 
As the imperial system of global order disintegrated in the 20th century, a boom 
occurred on the atlases of the world; more and more new states came into being. Within 
these new states developed forms of government different than the common types seen 
among the world powers at the time: not democratic, not totalitarian, not monarchist. 
Something in-between a democratic state and a totalitarian state had materialized: a 
system of government that came to be called authoritarian, first detailed in 1964 by Juan 
Linz in referring to Spain.175  In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, a wave of 
democratic governments emerged especially in the post-Soviet space. Those democratic 
states were not meant to survive as such, unfortunately. According to Larry Diamond, a 
subsequent wave occurred: a “democratic rollback.”  The populations of these new 
democratic states, according to Diamond, lost faith in democracy’s ability to improve 
their lives and their government, precipitating a renewed acquiescence to authoritarian 
alternatives.176  The result in many cases, as seen in Russia, was a new form of 
government, now lying between Linz’s original authoritarian model and a democratic 
system, incorporating clear aspects of both.   
This section will offer a brief outline of what makes an authoritarian state 
compared to a hybrid state before a detailed investigation of the authoritative-democratic 
mechanisms employed by Putin in creating and maintaining his form of governance. 
1. True Authoritarian States 
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan lay out four distinct characteristics of an 
authoritarian regime that differentiate it from a complete totalitarian regime. According to 
these authors, a totalitarian regime like in the USSR offered no economic, social, or 
political pluralism. It maintained a strong guiding ideology, often referencing a utopic 
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vision and forced mobilization of society into regime-created organizations while 
denouncing private life. Totalitarian regimes, too, consist of an often charismatic 
leadership absent limits to their power with ascension within the regime dependent on 
success within the ruling party organization.177 
In contrast, Linz and Stepan equate authoritarian regimes as offering “some 
limited political pluralism and often quite extensive economic and social pluralism.”178 
The political system of authoritarian regimes also operates largely absent both a wide-
ranging and elaborate ideology and extensive mass-mobilization. The leadership of an 
authoritarian regime “exercises power within formally ill-defined but actually quite 
predictable norms” with leadership usually drawn from within established “elite groups,” 
and offering “some autonomy in state careers and in military.”179   
There are many fully authoritarian states in the world today, but calling Putin’s 
Russia one of them would be a mistake, though at face value his regime seems to fit 
rather well into the four stereotypical descriptions outlined above. Russia does have some 
level of political pluralism; elections are held. Russians enjoy a significant degree of 
economic freedom compared to Soviet communist models. A communist ideology no 
longer encompasses all aspects of Russians’ lives, nor are they forced to mobilize to 
demonstrate participation and support of the regime. We must, instead, consider Putin’s 
Russia as something other-than a full authoritarian state. 
2. Hybrid Authoritarian States 
What makes Russia under Putin something short of an authoritarian regime?  
Namely the nature of Russia’s political pluralism and that pluralism’s implied pressure on 
the regime leadership. Specifically, Putin’s regime is subjected to routine popular 
elections in which opposition to the regime on the ballots could theoretically force the 
regime’s removal from power in accordance with a constitution that is still recognized as 
legitimate by the regime and the nation as a whole. Timothy Colton and Henry Hale 
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similarly support this theory: “regular elections are still conducted for the country’s most 
powerful positions and that these elections sill include at least some real alternative 
candidate or party, key factors that distinguish a hybrid regime from a full-fledged 
authoritarian one.”180  Wide political pluralism and a leadership constrained within a 
democratic constitution mean that Putin cannot operate as a complete authoritarian. That 
means he must still maintain a level of appeal to the electorate and voice opinions 
relevant to his constituents’ beliefs, like playing upon or instilling reservations about 
external enemies, like America. As it shall be demonstrated in subsequent sections, 
nevertheless, the political pluralism in Russia is only truly open and democratic on paper.   
If Russia under Putin falls short of a full-fledged authoritarian state, but remains 
significantly dissociated from a democracy, what can it be called?  Grigorii Golosov 
considers Putinist Russia as exhibiting “electoral authoritarianism.”  He states that the 
practice of elections, though largely unfair and far from Western liberal norms, “remain 
the principle source of regime legitimacy. 181  Nikolai Petrov et al employ the term 
“overmanaged democracy.”182 They justify their terminology by citing the fact that 
Putin’s Russia evolved from a much more liberal democratic form under Yeltsin; the 
Putin regime does not want to dismantle democracy, but rather keep it and simply ensure 
their perpetual victories in elections, thereby maintaining the personal benefits that the 
leaders have accrued under democracy.183  Nonetheless, the consensus remains clear. 
Marie Mendras effectively sums up many writers’ interpretations in referencing “2-sided 
behavior” based on authoritarian political methods while claiming to be a democracy.   
Dmitri Trenin similarly calls Russia an authoritarian state with democratic institutions,  
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which includes the institution of universal suffrage.184  For simplicities sake, I, like 
Colton and Hale, among others, shall henceforth use the term hybrid when referencing 
the Putinist government system in Russia. 
B. PUTIN’S AUTHORITARIAN CONTROLLED DEMOCRACY: THE 
MECHANISMS 
Putin’s Russia has been established for what it is: an authoritarian-democratic 
hybrid regime. This chapter shall now delve deeper into just how Putin succeeded in 
molding what was a flawed but relatively open and liberal democratic structure under 
Boris Yeltsin into what people see today: a controlled democracy under a single man and 
his loyalists. Yeltsin’s resignation at the end of 1999 elevated Vladimir Putin to the 
presidency of a nation in turmoil, both economic and political. The conditions were ripe 
for a new leader to exploit the nation’s disappointment with the current situation to justify 
a new course. That course would entail a stronger central authority as the apex of control 
within the state, a near authoritarian model partially reminiscent of Soviet times, though 
obviously lacking the aforementioned totalitarian characteristics. The Yeltsinian attempt 
at an American or Western socio-economic-democratic state would need to be 
completely discredited so that the anti-American-way of governing (i.e., the Putin way) 
could become the most logical alternative. 
Baker and Glasser reference a Putin “counterrevolution,” in which Russian 
democracy was not overtly dismantled, but no longer aggressively pursued. Rather, Putin 
allowed democracy to stagnate, spurning the nation’s retreat to a default form of 
authoritarianism, something much more historically natural to Russia.185  Putin would 
then employ the resources available to him as head of state to recentralize Russian 
authority back to the Kremlin, usurping or undermining the other centers of power that 
had emerged under Yeltsin: the media, regional governors, legislatures, and the business 
elites/oligarchs.186  But even under the new (similar to the old) centralized system, 
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Putin’s hybrid regime has to maintain the perceptions of non-authoritarianism in the eyes 
of its “constituents,” the world, and itself. As subsequent sections shall elucidate, the 
hybrid regime’s constituents, the Russian elites and the Russian people, thereby, retain 
some levels of leverage over even the authoritarian side of Putin’s two-faced regime. 
1. Attack the Yeltsin Years 
Chapter II already detailed Putin’s abandonment of Yeltsin’s early dream of 
integration into the Western world, followed by his attempted, though largely rebuffed, 
full integration with the Western world and United States. Dmitri Trenin surmised that 
Putin then reverted to the restoration of Russia as a non-aligned great global power, and 
to achieve or retain such great power status, the Russian state would require complete 
independence and unassailable sovereignty.187  The ruling regime had to be safe from any 
pressure or external support, be they foreign or domestic. Putin would eventually attribute 
renewed Russian economic and political stability to Russia’s and his own distancing 
themselves from American and Western influence and democratic formulae.188 
In order for Vladimir Putin to publically justify his new path for the Russian 
governmental system, one that could obfuscate the law and curb Yeltsin-era freedoms, he 
first attacked and discredited the current/former system: the Yeltsinian turmoil-ridden 
endeavor for an Americanized/Western democracy and free-market capitalism. 
According to Marie Mendras, the Putinist regime built their “order and stability” state 
around perpetual condemnation of the 1990s and any accusations about the authoritarian 
nature of their policies brought a quick rebuke to the effect of: “anything is better than the 
chaos of the past.”189  
In the United States, Presidents typically adhere to an unwritten rule and refrain 
from open and aggressive attacks of their predecessors by name; policy attacks, however, 
are the modus operandi. Putin openly commended Boris Yeltsin during his first years as 
president following Yeltin’s resignation. By 2002, however, Putin’s anti-Yeltsin attacks 
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had become commonplace, referring to the “period of weakness” and the need for 
increased “political stability” in addresses before the Russian Duma.190  Improved 
political stability, he asserted, would necessitate a change to executive authority to make 
the office of the president more “logically and rationally organized.”191  In other words, 
the President of Russia needed more centralized and authoritarian power, power that 
Yeltsin had given away in the tumultuous early 1990s in advance of an Americanized 
democratic federalism and free capitalism. 
As the years progressed, Putin continually compared Russia’s current situation to 
the situation before he entered office. He hostilely rebuked accusations of humanitarian 
atrocities in Chechnya, claiming how much more stable the Caucuses were compared to 
the previous decade.192  In 2003, according to Putin, conditions in Russia were 
astonishingly better than the “troubles of three years ago.”193  While running for a second 
term in 2004, he portrayed himself as an “anti-Yeltsin” and again blamed the liberal 
government of the 1990s for Russia’s problems more than the previous communist-
totalitarian system.194  Anti-Yeltsinism was not only a rebuke on the former flawed 
revolutionary leader, but also an attack on the ideals that Yeltsin had once trumpeted: an 
American or Western style of society. When re-elected in 2004, Putin still could not fray 
from attacking his predecessor, laying acclaim upon his regime for overcoming the 
problems that seemed “insurmountable back in 2000.”195  In Putin’s post re-election 2004 
address to the Duma, he attacks the Yeltsin years for diminishing Russia on the world 
stage. Renewed political and economic stability under Putin’s own leadership had finally 
sewn the necessary conditions for Russia to effectively “tackle” the problems leftover 
from that era.196  Putin condemns rampant corruption and immorality in 2006 as holdover 
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attributes of the 1990s.197  Putin’s comparisons of a stable and prosperous Russia under 
himself compared to the turmoil of the Yeltsin years would never stop, and have not to 
this day. 
Vladimir Putin succeeded in demonizing the Yeltsin years (i.e., the 
American/Western experiment in Russia) so well, that the Russian populace, by and 
large, proved willing to overlook the radical changes he was instituting against the 
democratic system that he inherited and many of the civil liberties people had 
unknowingly enjoyed. In Russia, the Yeltsin years came to be remembered not as any 
sort of triumph of democracy over communism or a period of new personal freedoms and 
liberties, but rather just a time of great hardship and instability.198  Putin, with the (then) 
current type of American government-economic system discredited, could proceed to 
change it for his personal and political benefit.  
2. State Control and Resource Theory 
As mentioned previously, Putin would embark on a mission to restore the 
supreme authority of the Russian executive over the other centers of power that had 
evolved during the “chaotic period” under Yeltsin.199   The recentralization of power 
back to the Kremlin necessitated a usurping or undermining of the economic leaders, 
namely the business elites and oligarchs, the media, the regional governors, and the 
federal legislatures.200 
Vladimir Putin completed his PhD dissertation in 1996 on the topic of strategic 
planning in the natural resource sector. Though there is ongoing debate over the academic 
integrity of Putin’s work, his vision for Russia’s economic future seemed obvious. A 
Brookings Institution analysis of his writing concluded that “Putin favors a market 
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economy with strong state regulation and preemptive power in the economy.”201  The 
state, thereby, would need to insert itself into facets of the economy to ensure the 
protection of state interests. The details of Putin’s power play against the formerly 
independent business oligarchs is too complicated a topic for this paper. The Kremlin’s 
insertion into the natural resource sector, once the purview entirely of the business elites 
in the 1990s, would effectively bring Russian big-industry, one of the four pre-Putin 
centers of power, under Kremlin supervision. 
Much more pertinent to this thesis’s topic of anti-Americanism is Putin’s 
commandeering of one of the other centers of power, the free-mass media that existed 
prior to his presidency. Vladimir Putin’s enmity toward any media organization that 
perpetuates anti-government or anti-Putin rhetoric is common knowledge. Putin and his 
regime have successfully established the dominant position within the Russian media, 
through state-owned and operated outlets and the supposed independent outlets that are 
owned and operated by wealthy Putin loyalists. It is that domineering control of most of 
the mass-media, especially the television channels in Russia, that can be attributed to the 
unfettered ability of Putin’s Kremlin to force their messages upon the whole Russian 
audience. According to the Levada Center polling in 2011, 74% of the Russian populace 
watches the state-run television stations as their primary source of information and 
news.202   It is basic resource theory according to Vladimir Shlapentokh; the government 
controls the media resources as the prime vessels of information dissemination, and 
thereby is able to control the information that gets disseminated.203  That information 
message could be anti-American in nature, anti-opposition, but never anti-Putin or anti-
regime.   
In 2005, Putin extolled the virtues and necessity of state-run TV and media, 
saying that they should be “as objective as possible, free from the influence of any 
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particular groups, and that they reflect the whole spectrum of public and political forces 
in the country.”204  Based on the reality of Putin’s media control, his above statement 
could be read as follows:  the media should be as objective as possible on issues of non-
importance to the regime and overtly subjective otherwise; it should be free from the 
influence of any particular group not friendly to Putin’s regime; the media should reflect 
the whole spectrum of pro-Putin public and pro-Putin political forces in the country. A 
month after that speech, Putin, when confronted by a Western journalist over the non-
independent nature of the three primary Russian TV stations, quickly refuted the 
allegations, referring to the joint-stock nature of two of the station’s ownership, even 
though the state and Putin loyalists held majority shares. 205  He further pointed to the 
proliferation of thousands of independent radio and print newspapers as a source of 
information for the people while ignoring the statistics showing TV as the prime 
information source for the people.206 
Putin’s state-media control, as we shall see in Chapter IV, remains the primary 
mechanism by which the regime can manipulate and disseminate news, information, and 
propaganda to the masses. The Soviets, and in reality any authoritarian regime, acted 
similarly. By controlling the media, the Soviets, like Putin, could control the level of anti-
American news or propaganda that reached the isolated Russian population and thereby 
directly control the population’s anti-American aggressiveness, which prior to 1947 was 
tepid at worst. Soviet leaders intensified or curtailed the anti-American propaganda in 
their media throughout the Cold War. Under Stalin it was rampant; under Brezhnev it 
was restricted while pursuing a mutual détente; by the time of Gorbachev’s Perestroika, it 
was practically non-existent.207   
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3. Maintaining the Illusion 
The Putin regime re-inserted extreme government influence in economic sectors 
and the media. It simultaneously employed those very state-resources, like near 
monopolistic mass-media control, to further guarantee the long-term survival of the 
Putinist regime in the face of democratic institutions. For the benefit of observers, both 
foreign and domestic, the perception of democracy had to be maintained, especially while 
the spirit of liberal democracy was being usurped.  “Putin’s Kremlin uses media 
repression as an indispensable part of a strategy to prevent the emergence of credible 
opposition that could seriously challenge the current regime.”208  Putin would employ the 
mechanisms inherent within the authoritarian aspects of his government to ensure that his 
government would not face any legitimate democratic opposition, be it from an 
individual in an election or a political party. Those mechanisms included open but highly 
controlled and manipulated elections as well as debilitating legal constraints against non-
Putinist political organizations passed and implemented by Putinist-controlled 
legislatures. As discussed in Chapter II, any political or mass opposition that did arise 
during and beyond Putin’s second term was immediately vilified by Putin and his proxies 
as agents of foreign/American influence; anti-Americanism had become a critical facet in 
Putin’s democratic face as much as his authoritarian face.   Anti-Americanism had 
emerged as but another tool employed within an authoritarian control mechanism to 
garner democratic political benefits. 
a. “Democratic” Elections 
Routine elections remain the key to maintaining the illusion or semblance 
of democratic governance in Putin’s hybrid Russia. Unfortunately, the elections under 
Putin have become more and more a mechanism to uphold the appearance of preserving 
the institution of universal suffrage than a way to truly challenge the regime’s hold on 
power. The populace during the Putin years has become disenchanted with the 
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democratic process and public life because “it has been emptied of content.”209  In 
accordance with the Russian constitution, any election that fails to garner 50% 
participation among eligible voters is deemed invalid; Putin’s regime, therefore, needs 
people to vote. If too many people refrain from voting, more pro-regime ballot stuffing 
becomes necessary, making the election increasingly likely to draw public criticism as 
completely illegitimate.   
Putin’s first election in 2000 was the most non-fraudulent election of his 
era. A plurality of the population legitimately rallied to support him at the ballot box, 
fearing the opposition alternatives, which was still comprised of communists. A degree of 
electioneering, however, was necessary from the Yeltsin/Putin machine to ensure Putin 
received a majority vote, thereby averting a potentially costly run-off against a powerful 
communist opposition candidate Gennady Zyuganov.210  Even before the presidential 
elections, the Putin/Yeltsin loyalists employed the means of the state media to discredit 
Yevgeny Primakov, the most powerful potential opponent to Putin and the new pro-Putin 
Unity political party. After Unity’s victory in the 1999 Duma elections, Primakov 
dropped out of the presidential race, eventually becoming a close confidant of Putin 
himself.211  
By the time of the next round of elections in 2003 and 2004, Putinists had 
gained control over the most important media outlets. State controlled television launched 
never ending attacks on the communist party while promoting Putin’s United Russia 
Party (formerly Unity) in the Duma elections.212  So worried were the Putin loyalists over 
a the necessity to have a Duma with some semblance of opposition that the Kremlin 
ordered state TV to run additional stories and air time to the pro-democratic political 
parties, like Yabloko, hoping to keep their ballot support above the 5% threshold 
guaranteeing them proportionally allocated seats in the new legislature; they failed.213  
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The 2003 Duma elections brought a two-thirds United Russia majority to the Duma, 
which would grant Putin and his allies the constitutional legality to change the Russian 
constitution, to include future election laws. Marat Gelman, who was appointed by 
Putin’s Kremlin to an executive position at the state-run Channel One, resigned the day 
after the Duma elections having accomplished the mission ordered of him: the communist 
party had been routed and United Russia had a super-majority. He even admitted as much 
about Putin and the regime: “They’ve got all the instruments as their disposal now and it 
is very dangerous.”214   
Constitutional changes did ensue. In the aftermath of the Beslan school 
tragedy in September 2004, Putin exploited people’s fear regarding that incident to alter 
democratic processes in Russia. He, with super-majority legislative support, ended direct 
elections of governors and republic presidents. He also reformed election laws and 
procedures making it increasingly difficult for opposition groups and parties to pose 
serious challenges to Putin and United Russia’s dominance within the democratic 
process.215  The direct election of governors was eventually restored under Medvedev, to 
be altered again upon Putin’s return in 2012. The Putinist center, nevertheless, held the 
peripheral democratic institutions under its boot, like the governors and regional 
legislatures. Regional authorities’ position and career, be it the governor or bureaucrats, 
has become dependent on their ability to deliver election victories to the “party of 
power,” namely Putin and United Russia.216  
After his party’s Duma victory, Putin’s presidential election in early 2004 
was characterized by an aura of inevitability according to Baker and Glasser. Putin 
refused to participate in debates and his Kremlin machine effectively dissuaded any real 
contenders from joining the race who could keep Putin from 50%. Knowing they would 
need to “confer a stamp of legitimacy on the race in the west,” and especially the United 
States, Putin’s machine tried to entice prominent democratic candidates to stay in the 
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race.217  With the real potential of a 50% non-vote by the public after the three primary 
democratic candidates dropped out accusing the government of election and campaign 
fraud, the Putin apparatus was forced to rig the election results to show a 64% 
participation rate.218 
Election manipulation in all subsequent elections would be so 
commonplace that by the time of the 2011/2012 election season, majorities of people 
polled (54%) firmly believed that Russian elections are and were routinely perverted to 
keep the ruling (Putinist) bureaucracy in power.219  The so-called Putin-Medvedev 
tandem did not aid in dispelling those rumors. Russia generally welcomed the 2008 
election results that placed a Putin ally, Dmitri Medvedev, into the presidency but kept 
Putin as Prime Minister. People feared a post-Putin return to instability and turmoil like 
the 1990s, ideas which Putin promoted as seen in the previous sections. People, therefore, 
supported the Medvedev candidacy knowing that Putin, and thereby assumedly the 
economic prosperity under Putin, would also remain.220  Marie Mendras, however, 
considers the 2008 tandem arrangement as Putin’s final circumvention of any 
constitutional limits on presidential power.221  A consecutively two term-limited 
president could just become prime minister for a term and theoretically return after 
another presidential election, which is exactly what would happen in 2012. Sizable 
pluralities, if not majorities, of Russian people polled during the Medvedev years 
believed the new president was still controlled by Putin and his loyalists and that Putin’s 
powerful control within government would continue regardless of when Putin himself left 
public office.222   
The 2011/2012 election season, however, bore witness to something not 
yet seen during the era of Putin’s hybrid regime: large mass-protests and riots over the 
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issue of election fraud. Putinists had been “managing” the election outcomes for so many 
years; what was different this time?  Marie Mendras offers a detailed analysis of the 
2011–2012 government protests. She contends that people had finally gotten fed up with 
the now fourth managed election resulting in the same political party and individuals’ 
victories. People were genuinely disappointed over the Putin-Medvedev position switch, 
hoping Medvedev would run for President in his own right, even if still under Putin’s 
influence. This election cycle was the first one where overt and widespread proof of 
election fraud circulated through the populace, though not by Putin-controlled mass 
media outlets, but rather by social media and the Internet outside of Kremlin control.223 
As mentioned in Chapter II, Putin condemned and sought to repress the 
protestors. Having witnessed the color revolutions of the previous decade and the 
ongoing Arab Spring uprisings against authoritarian rulers, Putin ridiculed the opposition 
movement as an orchestration and tool of American and Western interference upon 
Russian sovereignty. Putin’s election to the Presidency in 2012 was never in doubt, and, 
as seen in the previous chapter, his anti-American rhetoric did not die down with the 
successful suppression of the election protests. But the mere fact that the mass protests 
were allowed to occur, though not without varying levels of regime suppression, remains 
important to note. With it ever more difficult to check the regime through elections, could 
the public influence the regime through mass movement?  That idea shall be further 
explored in latter sections of this chapter.   
b. Political Parties 
As observed in the previous section, and summarized succinctly by 
Thomas Remington, Vladimir Putin effectively subjugated the Parliament and ushered in 
“a party system in which United Russia dominates regional and federal elections while 
opposition parties are sidelined.”224  The political parties may be sidelined, but they are 
still allowed to exist, even if under increasingly bureaucratized legal regulations. The 
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problem, therefore, is not a total lack of political opposition to Putin and United Russia, 
but rather that the opposition lacks any true unity of agendas, leadership, or mass 
appeal.225 The United Russia party, according to Ol’ga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen 
White, does not represent a political ideology in the sense commonly observed in 
Western liberal democracies, but rather is a political party based on support of a man, 
Vladimir Putin, and his governing style.226   
Therefore, in the course of Putin’s second term, the series of electoral 
reforms that he initiated which curtailed political party activities and more strictly 
regulated funding, were, in effect, attacks on an already beaten enemy. The result being 
that by the end of Putin’s second term, United Russia was the only party with widespread 
visibility and viability.227 The other recognized and remotely organized parties appeal to 
too small a segment of the electorate for them to have any chance of upsetting United 
Russia or Putin in an election. But, as alluded to, a unified opposition party or coalition of 
parties that could appeal to the masses could, theoretically, challenge the regime. 
Unfortunately, such an amalgamation is unlikely to evolve in the near future.  
C. ROLE OF ELITES AND THE PUBLIC IN PUTIN’S MACHINE: AN 
AUTOCRAT STILL ANSWERABLE TO OTHERS? 
If challenge to the Putin regime from elections and organized political party 
opposition, two principal democratic institutions, remains unlikely and difficult in the 
current environment, what, if anything, could challenge the regime?  What danger exists 
that could result in the ouster of or force change to Putin’s hybrid system?  The Putin 
regime’s survival remains in the hands of two segments of the society, and more 
specifically, their perpetual mutual ambivalence or abstention toward politics and public 
life: the elites and the general public. Neither one is likely to be able to challenge the 
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Putinist system alone. Graeme Robertson notes that Putin and his allies have become 
extremely adept in the realm of “hybrid state-society relations.”228  Robertson proposes 
that the Putin regime, rather than just using force like a true authoritarian and incurring 
additional criticism from Western democracies, has instituted a level of legal and 
bureaucratic control over the civil society. They include highly-restrictive and 
preventative measures to curb legally sanctioned mass demonstrations and protests and 
licensing requirements for public groups, like NGOs. Such measures, Robertson 
contends, were designed to create an “impression of permanence” around the regime to 
keep the scale of public movements small and thereby dissuade the elite class from 
fracturing and joining a public movement to form a viable opposition.229 
If public dissatisfaction like that that was witnessed in 2011–2012 was able to 
attract the support of significant segments of the elite class, then a truly unified 
opposition movement might pose a credible challenge against “the man.”  So, until both 
sectors of society are willing to simultaneously drop their acquiescence to the regime’s 
permanence, then Putin, like Napoleon, will strive to keep them divided and conquer each 
ones’ isolated opposition as they arise. Putin also strives to keep both segments more 
scared of what could happen should his hybrid system fall, which is where anti-
Americanism and fear instigation come into play. 
1. Elites 
The Russian elites, be they business oligarchs, politicians, or something else, have 
been forced to figuratively sign a type of non-aggression pact with the Putinist regime. 
Putin, as discussed earlier in this chapter, sought to reconsolidate power back to the 
Kremlin from the Yeltsin-era oligarchs, along with the other aforementioned pre-Putin 
power-centers. Yeltsin-era oligarchs who publically opposed Putin’s re-centralization 
found themselves charged with corruption in the Russian courts. Boris Berezovsky and 
Vladimir Gusinsky were among the first of the powerful elites attacked by Putin’s 
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Kremlin and the courts early in Putin’s first term. Both controlled assets in the petroleum 
and media sectors that Putin sought to re-implement state control over, to which the once 
powerful businessmen remained publically defiant. They were forced to flee the country 
and seek asylum in Europe.230  Putin, after driving those two oligarchs from the country, 
issued a warning to the other elites, so eloquently paraphrased by Baker and Glasser: 
“keep out of politics or face his wrath.”231  Putin in 2003 then went after Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, the wealthiest oil tycoon in Russia and owner of the Yukos Corporation. 
Khodorkovsky’s arrest, trial, and imprisonment for alleged corruption would draw 
international attention and angst. A valuable subject for another time but too lengthy to 
discuss here, Khodorkovsky became the poster-boy for Putinist usurpation of the oligarch 
and elite class. He grew increasingly critical of Putin’s regime and planned to use his 
wealth to influence politics and possibly run as a candidate against Putin himself.232 
Putin had enforced his previous mandate: challenge the regime and lose 
everything. Unabridged loyalty to the regime or at least non-involvement in politics 
among the oligarchs and elite class became the modus operandi. Putin had effectively 
instituted negative incentives for loyalty.233  The oligarchs and elites that demonstrate 
loyalty to the regime are thus rewarded. Karen Dawisha refers to the entire system as a 
“corporatist-kleptocratic regime,” in which many of the elites’ personal interests have 
become state interests.234  Loyalty to Putin, thereby, has conferred upon many elites the 
benefits of state resources and influences to help the elites achieve their personal gains. 
Putin business and elite loyalists continue to grow rich through state contracts with Putin-
controlled companies, though the paper-trail of such corruption never implicates Putin 
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himself.235  Powerful people within the criminal underworld, too, escape arrest and 
persecution by the Putinist state in exchange for favors to the Putinists.236 
The elites that are not ardent Putinists, but simply “go along to get along” and 
survive, represent the most dangerous type of elite: potentially disaffected and secretly 
waiting to pounce upon a weakened regime. That signal of weakness, according to 
Robertson, could come in the form of a seemingly uncontrollable public outrage, as we 
shall see in the next section.237   
2. The Public at Large 
The Putinist regime has become less and less accountable to the traditional 
mechanisms of government accountability, like elections, legislative checks and balances, 
etc. Nikolai Petrov et al. conclude that Russians recognize this fact and also recognize 
that the only means still available to them to influence the regime must emanate from 
outside the traditional hybrid-democratic system: mass movements in the form of 
protests, riots, etc.238  But why did the public allow themselves to become complacent 
and seemingly ignore the authoritarian re-emergence?  The answer lies again in the 
Yeltsin years. As detailed earlier in this chapter, the public tacitly accepted a curtailment 
of liberal democratic freedoms and institutions in favor of economic, political, and 
national stability, which they perceived as having been accomplished by Vladimir 
Putin.239  In so doing, Putin had successfully convinced the populace that the 
Yeltsinian/American model of governance would not suffice, so Russian attitude toward 
an Americanized system or anything resembling it in Russia grew equally acrimonious.   
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Economic improvement, therefore, became the backdrop for the public’s 
continued apathetic approach to their government and public life. Stephen Kotkin further 
elaborates on the apolitical-ness of Russian society, especially the robust, but quiet, 
middle class. Most of Russia’s middle class serve either the government or government-
influenced businesses and, therefore, employ political standoffishness as a strategy to 
hopefully keep their wealth and access to superior services inherent in middle-class 
status.240  David Remnick supports a similar notion, that Russia’s middle class is “still 
more interested in prosperity than in law or democracy.”241  Marie Mendras details the 
public’s relative acceptance, if not happiness, at the notion of Putin staying within the 
higher government authority in 2008. People hoped his presence would avert the loss of 
their newfound wealth with a return to Yeltsin-era troubles.242 
Vladimir Shlapentokh goes further. Citing polling data in 2005, he attributes the 
public’s trust and acceptance of Putin toward their widespread distrust of the other 
democratic institutions, like Parliament, political parties, and the media. Putin, thereby, 
receives a default vote of confidence from the public because all other social and political 
institutions capable of offering order have been summarily discredited.243  One cannot 
overestimate Putin’s success in demonizing Russia’s experiments in American and 
Western democratic and political institutions. 
Putin, therefore, needs the public’s support or, like the elites, at least their 
ambivalence. Without it, and as opinion of the Putin regime and its actions becomes more 
negative, mass public movements like those seen in 2011–2012 could become more 
commonplace. Much of Putin’s public support is “rational” according to Daniel 
Treisman; it is rational support for ongoing economic prosperity and rational support for 
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a strong, determined, competent and capable leader according to Colton and Hale.244  If 
those lynchpins of his popularity were to someday disappear, Putin’s hybrid state 
structure could be in jeopardy. Putin, therefore, needs more than just coincidental 
economic success under his reign and the Russian peoples’ general affinity for a 
strongman. And as we shall witness in Chapter IV, anti-Americanism, always a critical 
factor of Vladimir Putin’s psychology, and already employed in democratic elections, can 
also be employed as a means to garner and retain domestic political “support.” 
D. CONCLUSION 
Vladimir Putin, in his May 2000 First Inaugural Address, celebrated the virtues of 
democracy and promised to uphold, preserve, and advance the democratic government 
that he had inherited.245  That would imply he intended to advance the liberal 
constitutionalism (i.e. American/Western democracy) originally envisioned in the early 
1990s. Contrast that address to his Second Inaugural in May 2004 in which the word 
democracy or any derivative thereof failed to gain mention even once.246  By the time of 
his second term, Putin’s authoritarian resurgence was in full swing, resulting in a hybrid 
democratic-authoritarian governing system that has persisted to this day. Marie Mendras 
attributes Putin’s anti-liberal democratic retreat as much to his change in stance toward 
the United States and the West. During his first term, he still valued the Western 
democracies opinions regarding the liberal-democratic nature of the new Russia; by his 
second term, he did not.247  This assertion fits in line with the observations noted in 
Chapter II regarding Putin’s later-term policy shifts vis-à-vis Russia as an independent 
global power center in lieu of integration with America and the West. 
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This chapter has established the nature of Vladimir Putin’s hybrid regime in 
Russia. Stephen Kotkin provides an eloquent summation to the general consensus about 
that nature of Russian government and politics: “a ramshackle authoritarian system with 
some democratic trappings.”248  The authoritarian aspects often garner the most attention 
from outside observers: resource theory and media control, cronyism, state persecution of 
(potential) opposition leaders and groups, etc. But the remnants of democratic 
foundations could, in theory, pose a risk to the Putinist regime’s longevity as much as any 
popular backlash against its more repressive tendencies, which explains the necessity of 
the regime to employ authoritarian mechanisms to rigidly control the remaining 
democratic practices. Elections must be held but rigged to ensure Putinist victories; 
opposition political parties must be allowed to exist but bureaucratically forced into an 
insurmountable competitive disadvantage compared to the ruling Putinist party.  
The Russian people, by and large, enjoy the benefits of post-Communist 
consumerism. As Dmitri Trenin writes, however, Putin’s Russia exists in a state of 
“growth without development, capitalism without democracy, and great power policies 
without international appeal.”249  As long as Russians remain economically well-off 
compared to the much-demonized Yeltsin years, they are more likely to fray from the 
public sphere and maintain a default vote of confidence in Putin and his less-than-liberal 
constitutionalism.   
The public alone is unlikely to be able to force the hand of the regime, even if 
disenchanted with Putin and mobilized onto the streets like in 2011. A union of elites and 
the masses, however, could bring the hybrid system to its knees, making the 
authoritarian’s need to keep one or both segments loyal, or at least ambivalent, that much 
more pressing. Economic success can placate the masses and the elites. A general 
consensus has emerged that fossil fuel prices more than any other factor spurned Russia’s 
economic recovery, and thereby political stability around Putin during the 2000s, a theory 
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supported by Daniel Treisman, among many others.250  What happens if and when the oil 
money dries up?  What happens if the widespread public prosperity due to natural 
resource exports is reversed and the Putinist system is unable to force an economic 
recovery?   
The coincidence of economic improvement under Putin has helped keep the 
masses mollified. Likewise, the threat of regime-imposed poverty upon the elites has 
similarly forced their abstention from the political sphere. Putin has repressed those 
powerful elites that dare to offer criticism or challenge to his government, be they 
business oligarchs, political leaders, crime bosses, etc. The prime reward for loyalty or 
ambivalence is survival; the cost for disloyalty or involvement is the loss of everything 
that makes them rich and powerful. Putin, during a meeting of the business elites a few 
months after his first presidential election, threatened to “revise the results of 
privatization,” unless they collectively shied from political involvement and criticism of 
his government.251  Some got the lesson, some did not. 
A person’s wallet, therefore, creates a powerful incentive, whether the person is 
just a middle class worker, or a corporate billionaire. If the billionaires and the workers 
find common cause to challenge the regime, be it over an economic collapse or political 
corruption, then Putin could find himself demonized and discredited like he had done to 
his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. Some of authoritarian tools available to Putin to ensure the 
survival of his hybrid system have been outlined in this chapter, as well as how anti-
Yeltsinism can be equated as anti-any semblance of American-style government. This 
chapter has established how Putin is, or could be, accountable to the elites and public and 
the necessity of keeping them beholden to him. Chapter IV will explore Putin’s 
employment of anti-Americanism in his domestic realm, and how truly widespread anti-
Americanism is in Russia beyond Putin’s Kremlin’s machine. Anti-Americanism has  
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become yet another asset in his authoritarian toolbox, in conjunction with those 
mentioned in this chapter, all designed to reap continued political benefits like public and 










IV. THE POLITICS OF ANTI-AMERICANISM 
Vladimir Putin did not conjure widespread Russian anti-Americanism from 
scratch upon his ascension to power on December 31, 1999. It had existed around the 
globe and among the world populace as well as within Russian politicians, elites, and the 
public for some time. Global anti-Americanism in the 1990s, according to Fouad Ajami, 
was much more rampant than many passively observed, and that post 9/11 sympathies for 
America were insincere and fleeting. Historical animosity toward America, thereby, 
cannot be supplanted but only temporarily hidden.252  Much of the recent global anti-
Americanism has been attributed to recent U.S. actions and policy, like those within the 
Global War on Terror, Iraq, and economic globalization. Russian anti-Americanism can 
also be attributed to the Soviet past and the history of the ideology surrounding the anti-
Imperialist/Western class struggle. This “old” form of anti-Americanism still underlies 
the “new” form anchored in hatred of current U.S. policies, global influence, and 
lifestyle.253  Chapter II detailed the manner in which Putin’s inherent anti-Americanism 
was hidden for a time. A lingering product of Soviet times, Russian anti-Americanism in 
the early 1990s under then President Yeltsin, therefore, simply lay dormant, waiting to 
resurface, which it did most notably during the Balkan crises of the later 1990s, followed 
by resurgent global anti-Americanism during the run-up to the 2003 Iraq invasion and its 
aftermath.254 
Chapter II offered an explanation regarding the nature and historical roots of 
Vladimir Putin’s anti-Americanism. This chapter shall offer a subsequent analysis of the 
nature and history of the anti-Americanism of the Russian public and the Russian elites, 
the two segments of society in which Putin’s hybrid-authoritarian hold on power are 
contingent, as discussed in Chapter III.   More than a decade’s worth of polling data on 
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the nature and character of the Russian public’s anti-Americanism will be referenced as 
evidence showing that the level of the public’s hostility toward America tends to parallel 
the level of anti-American vociferousness emanating from Putin’s Kremlin, as measured 
by its messages/propaganda. Chapter III detailed the resource theory behind that message 
and propaganda control. As Putin’s anti-American displays increase in number and 
vociferousness, the general anti-American mood of his populace also increases.  
Additionally, a study of the Russian elites’ anti-Americanism over the same 
timeframe will show how their hostility pre-dates Putin’s presidency and has become a 
necessary personal characteristic for advancement or survival within the regime and 
within the remnant democratic processes. Chapter II detailed Putin’s inherent nature that 
makes him truly anti-American. He has shown a persistent attitude and widespread 
animosity to all things American, which is how Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krastev 
define anti-Americanism.255 This chapter shall demonstrate that anti-Americanism has 
been employed by Putin as tool to demonstrate solidarity with his constituents, both the 
public and the elites. Such solidarity also entails distraction for those society segments 
from the more potentially damaging domestic problems during Putin’s entire tenure in 
office, problems that Russia has faced, is facing, or that lie just over the horizon. Anti-
Americanism as an authoritarian domestic political tool, therefore, can garner significant 
benefits for the authoritarian who utilizes it. 
A. POLLING PERSPECTIVE ON THE RUSSIAN PUBLICS’ ANTI-
AMERICANISM 
The intensity of the Russian populaces’ anti-Americanism, defined previously as 
a general antipathy toward most things American, may appear consistent, but is really 
anything but. Its roots “do not go very deep” according to Vladimir Shlapentokh, who 
claims that the Putinist state and its media control are to blame for any rampant anti-
Americanism in Russia. Changes in regime and media tone would likely subdue 
widespread anti-Americanism in the countryside. As examined in Chapter III, with 
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control of the major mass-media, Putin, like the Soviets, can manipulate the level of anti-
American news or propaganda that reaches the Russian population and thereby directly 
control their level of anti-Americanism. So the current Russian public’s anti-
Americanism may be widespread, but it is not psychologically deep-rooted compared to 
Putin and many elites.256   
According to the Levada Center, one of the pre-eminent organizations that has 
been gauging Russian public opinion since the late 1980s, vast majorities of people 
polled from 2003 through 2011 consider the United States to be an aggressor state 
seeking influence or outright control of other countries. During that same timeframe, 
large pluralities or even small majorities consistently rate relations between the United 
States and Russia positively with less than a majority, and often as low as 25%, believing 
the United States is inherently unfriendly or hostile toward the Russian Federation.257  
Within such data, however, when observed over the course of several years, marked 
fluctuations are observed. Russian public opinion toward the United States often 
oscillates as much as relations between the two states varies from “allies” to “friends” to 
“partners” to “colleagues” to “enemies” and back again. 
1. The Pre-Putin Years 
After the fall of the communist state, the Russian public attitude toward the 
United States ballooned to near jubilant levels in the early Yeltsin years. The Russian 
populace blamed the dying Soviet system, and therefore Mikhail Gorbachev, for their 
rotten existence, springing an overwhelming rush to support Boris Yeltsin and his 
promises of democratic and capitalistic reforms that would bring materialistic wealth 
back to the Russian people. U.S. support for Yeltsin and other democratic reformers, as 
well as condemnation of the 1991 coup attempt, subsequently induced a dramatic wave of 
pro-Americanism.258  Such resounding pro-Americanism would not last. 
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Russian media’s portrayal of America directly attributed to reduced Russian 
public anti-Americanism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Gorbachev’s perestroika and 
glasnost reforms resulted in a freer media that, devoid of state-mandated anti-Western 
propaganda, could in turn focus its criticism upon the failings of the communist system 
and its leaders and provide more positive portrayals of those entities opposed to the 
status-quo Soviet system: Yeltsin and America.259  The subsequent Yeltsin years, in 
which democratic and capitalistic reforms sought to turn Russian into a Western-style 
state in short order, also included a media network largely free from significant 
government interference. In the early 1990s, the newly free Russian media’s focus 
remained the perpetual denouncing of communism and extolling the virtues of American 
liberalism.260 
Within a few years, the initial pro-American ecstasy was wearing thin. By 1993, 
under conditions of ongoing economic troubles and political turmoil, the Russian 
peoples’ lives had failed to improve on the scale originally promised by Yeltsin. The 
“beginning of disillusionment” toward American-style democracy and capitalism had 
been sown.261  A study conducted in 1995 among young Russian adults bears similar 
conclusions. The study group had shown an initial widespread affinity for an 
Americanized way of life in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse. By 1995, 
however, a growing number had become significantly less sympathetic to America and 
the West. As many people within the group now questioned American power, influence, 
and lifestyle as the number of those who still aspired to a Western-styled existence.262  
Because of the failure of Yeltsin’s reforms in the public’s everyday life, the public’s 
negative perceptions of any Americanized political, economic, and social system in 
Russia were also growing. Their rotten experience on the path toward Americanized life 
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helped generate or re-surface an attitude of broad anti-anything American. That attitude 
serves as the basis of anti-Americanism as previously defined. 
As U.S.-Russian tensions increased in the later 1990s, in conjunction with 
continually deteriorating domestic chaos for Yeltsin, the Kremlin stopped pressuring the 
media to refrain from anti-American news and exposés. The Kremlin instead sought to 
direct some of the rampant anti-Yeltsin criticism toward the United States. Anti-
American news and portrayals increased in the later years of Yeltsin’s tenure as the 
Balkan and Kosovo crises spiraled. This provided a benefit of distracting the Russian 
populace from their domestic troubles and re-focusing their frustrations toward an 
external “scapegoat:” America.263  Putin would later perfect this tactic.   
The 1990s, as turbulent as they were for the Russian populace in the politico-
economic arenas, proved equally turbulent in their views toward the United States. From 
euphoria as the Soviet Union fell, to disillusionment as the promised benefits of the 
Americanized system failed to materialize, to outright vocal hostility over American 
actions on the international scene, especially in Europe.  “Uncle Sam was blamed for 
starting and escalating the war in Kosovo.”264 Shiraev and Zubock assert that some 
moderate proportion of the Russian population, approximately 30%, held consistent anti-
American views throughout the 1990s.265  Vladimir Putin, an intrinsic anti-American 
himself, therefore, would climb to authority at a time when the Russian public had grown 
increasingly receptive to more anti-Americanism. 
2. Under Putin:  Fluctuating or as Steady as Putin? 
Russian public anti-Americanism during the Putin years would seem to vary as 
much as relations between the two states vary. On face value, the Russian people’s 
attitude toward the United States also appears to conform closely with global trends 
during this timeframe. There appear, however, distinctive periods of peak pro/anti-
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Americanism within the numbers.  9/11 resulted in a global wave of sympathy for the 
United States, as well as within Russia; Putin’s immediate offering of assistance garnered 
massive popular support from the Russian people.266 Polling conducted between 2002 
and 2007 showed similar vast majorities in support of Putin’s policies involving Russian 
support of the wider Global War on Terrorism.267 Putin and his people were on the same 
page in backing a pro-American policy at the time and an anti-terror policy once favor 
with America had worn out. But underneath the public’s sympathy, supporting the 
findings of Fouad Ajami, resided a still remnant hostility toward the United States. 
Polling in 2001 and 2002 indicated a level of schadenfreude among the Russian populace, 
with majorities believing that America got what it deserved on 9/11 for U.S. actions like 
Hiroshima, Nagasaki, the Gulf War and ongoing actions against Iraq, and military action 
in Yugoslavia/Kosovo.268   
Figure 1 represents a running polling analysis of the general Russian popular 
attitude toward the United States starting in 1997. It measures the net difference in 
positive compared to negative responses among participants. A data point above the zero 
line indicates more people demonstrating a positive attitude than negative attitude toward 
America. A data point below the zero line indicates the reciprocal. As Figure 1 shows, the 
timeframe from 1998–1999 saw a dramatic turn toward a net-negative attitude among the 
populace. As discussed in the previous section, that timeframe coincides with Balkan 
crises as well as renewed anti-American news and propaganda portrayals from Yeltsin’s 
Kremlin and the Russian media. 
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Figure 1.  Index of Russians’ Attitude to the United States 1997–2011269 
Global anti-Americanism increased rapidly in the run-up and aftermath of the 
2003 Iraq invasion. As Putin distanced himself further and further from the United States 
as detailed in Chapter II, so too did the Russian public’s animosity toward America grow. 
After the Iraq invasion, 66% of Russians deemed U.S. military prowess as a major factor 
in creating an unsafe world; only 24% were happy that Saddam Hussein’s army folded so 
quickly during the invasion, instead hoping America would face a more difficult 
operation.270  Putin’s initial strangling of anti-American media reports during the first 
phases of the war soon were lifted, resulting in a wave of anti-American stories, 
subjective reports, and anti-American rhetoric from Kremlin allies about conditions in 
Iraq.271  The second major net-negative spike in Figure 1 correlates to the same 
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timeframe of the Iraq War and the Russian media’s never-ending critical coverage of it. 
As the decade continued and Putinist media persisted to trounce upon and over-
exaggerate anti-American news, the Russian public’s anti-Americanism continued to 
sharpen. Figure 1 shows the quarterly fluctuations from 2003–2008, but an extrapolated 
trend line would show that the overall trend slopes toward increasingly more negative 
attitudes toward the United States, with the net-positive never again reaching the mid-
1990s level. 
Putin’s second term became marked by repeated attacks on alleged American and 
Western interference in Russian affairs. The population seemed to accept such anti-
American propaganda as the Kremlin portrayed it.  57% of the population in 2007 
deemed any Western criticism of Russia as an improper intervention in Russian domestic 
affairs, with a plurality calling U.S. criticisms of Russian human rights unjustifiable.272  
Year by year from 2001–2010, majorities of the public considered U.S. BMD 
development and deployment one of the greatest threats to Russian security.273  Those 
instances are exactly what Putin and his authoritarian media machines had been 
preaching for years, showing just how accepting the Russian populace had become of 
whatever anti-American spin the Kremlin wanted to attach to any issue. Similarly, in 
2007, 80% believed the United States definitely or likely was attempting to interfere in 
Russian internal affairs and almost 50% believed Putin should, in turn, adopt a much 
firmer and more confrontational posture toward the United States.274  Figure 1 shows a 
third net-negative attitude peak in 2007 as Putin’s contorted propaganda effectively 
convinced his populace of a non-existent threat from America. His populace demanded a 
harder line toward the American threat, thereby justifying further anti-Americanism on 
the part of Putin’s Kremlin. A self-perpetuating cycle or feedback loop had developed. 
The fourth major peak period of Russian public anti-Americanism occurred also 
in conjunction with a peak period of Putinist propaganda against the United States and 
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West: during the 2008 conflict with Georgia. The net negative peak on Figure 1 in the 
2008 timeframe clearly demonstrates this. American and Western denunciations of 
Russian aggression in the South Caucus state were widespread. At the height of the crisis, 
the vast majority of Russians believed their country had “legitimate” enemies in the 
world, and 51% of that group unequivocally considered America one of those 
enemies.275  There was a similar spike that year in the number of people (45%) believing 
America was openly unfriendly or hostile to Russia, whereas most other years that 
number hovered around 25%.276 
On the question of public perception of the nature of U.S.-Russian relations, from 
2001–2011, majorities considered the two states’ relations to be either “normal, good, or 
friendly,” except when measured in the years 2008 and 2011, in which case majorities 
viewed the relations as “lukewarm, tense, or hostile.”277  2009 represents an interesting 
year, the year of the much scrutinized Obama-Medvedev “reset.”  The new presidents 
cordial relations coincided with an easing in anti-American sentiment within Russia, as 
66% polled believed Obama should not follow the course set by George W. Bush.278  
2009 witnessed a renewed majority-positive attitude toward the United States, around 
50%.279  The number of people considering America a blatant enemy of Russia also 
dropped during the early stages of the reset.280  Figure 1 shows the dramatic rise in net-
positive attitude during the first years of the Obama administration 2009–2010. The 
Putinist anti-American machine temporarily eased its vociferousness under Medvedev, 
though it would not remain restrained for long. 
The 2011–2012 public protests and election cycle brought renewed anti-American 
hostility from the Putinist Kremlin and political machine. Prime Minister Putin, running 
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again for President, as discussed in Chapter II, mobilized his machine to denounce 
protesters and political opponents as American stooges and traitors.281  The public took 
notice of the Putinist hostility and again gauged U.S.-Russian relations on a negative 
trend as mentioned above, and Figure 1 shows the sharp 2011 drop toward a net-negative 
attitude rating. If the polling sample continued into the first quarters of 2012, there would 
likely have been another net-negative peak on this graphic.  23% of the people adamantly 
believed the Putinist claims that America organized the protests to topple the Russian 
government; 22% concluded that Putin was simply spreading misinformation about the 
protesters’ foreign ties to discredit them.282 
A common thread is seen within the Russian public’s anti-American polling 
numbers: the numbers do fluctuate on a parallel pattern with the anti-American rhetoric 
and policy of their government, which is controlled by Putin. Putin controls the 
government and the mass-media and, therefore, is able to control the anti-Americanism of 
his public constituents. If Putin needs a more anti-American public, he can employ his 
government machine to show his anti-Americanism more vociferously which results in a 
more anti-American public mood. If Putin’s Kremlin eased its anti-Americanism, the 
public perceptions would largely follow suit, a conclusion largely supported in the studies 
by Vladimir Shlapentokh.283  Peak periods of anti-Americanism in Putin’s Russia 
correspond to peak periods of anti-American propaganda from Putin-controlled 
authoritarian machinations which thereby bring peak periods of tension in Russian-
American relations. 
B. ANTI-AMERICANISM OF THE ELITES 
The Russian public’s renewed anti-American bitterness can be traced back to the 
1990s. The anti-Americanism of the Russian elites, especially those that operated within 
the new democratic public sphere, can also be traced back to a similar timeframe. The 
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elites, as discussed, represent the other critical power base for Putin’s regime’s survival, 
along with widespread public “support.”  Putin must appeal to both bases, which 
becomes much easier when both bases share common beliefs or general attitudes, like 
those inherent in anti-Americanism. The Russian elites in turn, as the section will discuss, 
feed off and exploit the anti-Americanism of the public. Nociferous anti-Americanism 
from the elite segment of society, however, pre-dates its spawn within the general public. 
As Shlapentokh further argues, the anti-Americanism of the elites remains much deeper 
and more hostile than that of the populace.284  This notion was demonstrated by the 
public polling fluctuations in the previous section. More recently, Shlapentokh re-
asserted similar conclusions, holding that the elites adhere to and subsequently aid in the 
propagation of the anti-American ideology of Russia’s ruling class, namely Putin’s.285   
1. Disenchantment Under Yeltsin 
As mentioned previously, a significant segment of the Russian public, around 
25%, held perpetual anti-American proclivities regardless of external factors or stimuli.  
“If there is a public opinion base, there will be politicians who can and will represent 
these views on the level of elite politics.”286  In very early 1990s, as Shiraev and Zubock 
allude, there already existed anti-American elites in the public sphere, though they were 
often overshadowed by pro-Yeltsin affiliated officials. But soon the numbers of anti-
American public-elite figures would mushroom. As the public became increasingly 
crestfallen by the lack of economic and political progress under Boris Yeltsin, the 
political classes in Russia paralleled that disillusionment. The elites grew increasingly 
hostile toward Yeltsin’s pro-American/Western policies designed to turn Russia into a 
state like those in the West. By 1993, large blocs within the Duma voiced opposition to 
Yeltsin’s pro-American foreign and domestic policies. This compelled the Yeltsin 
government at times to concede to their hostile domestic opposition by increasing anti-
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American rhetoric from official Kremlin channels, though official policies initially 
remained unchanged.287 
The elites in Russia, specifically the political class, had grown increasingly anti-
American long before the Yeltsin government did and effectively dragged the Yeltsin 
government with them. In January 1996, only a few months before a presidential election, 
Yeltsin, faced with an overwhelming anti-American/Western opposition in the 
parliament, conceded to another one other their demands and dismissed the pro-American 
Foreign Minster Kozyrev, even though he and Yeltsin shared similar foreign policy 
ambitions for Russia.288  Yeltsin had been forced to placate the anti-American wolves 
within his government and replaced Kozyrev with Yevgeny Primakov. Primakov 
oversaw a reversal in Russian pro-American foreign policy that Yeltsin, now bowing to 
the anti-American dominated political classes, did not inhibit.289  
2. Anti-Americanism to Demonstrate one’s Political Bona Fides 
As the anti-American elite political class grew ever larger, forcing the once pro-
American Yeltsin government to conform, eventually the entire notion of a pro-American 
official in politics seemed impossible. The political tides were shifting further and further 
from the initial American embrace in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse. 
Americanism, as detailed in previous chapters, had fallen into disfavor as the Yeltsin-
American experiment continued to languish. Yeltsin’s domestic political opposition, who 
were overtly anti-American as discussed above, targeted and exploited all facets of 
Yeltsinian policies, to include his relationship with the United States.290  American and 
Western actions on the global scene during the 1990s further played into the hands of the 
anti-Yeltsin (i.e., anti-democratic) and nationalist opposition forces in Russia. Military 
action in the Balkans, bombings in Iraq, NATO expansion, etc., all contributed to an 
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“increased perception of growing intimidation from the West and the United States.”291  
The result by the later 1990s was palpable: no person could hope to survive in Russian 
electoral politics possessing a pro-American agenda. Westernizer politicians like those 
under Yeltsin in the early 1990s had vanished. Anti-Americanism, therefore, became a 
political necessity among the elites who wished to operate in the public domain.   
By the time Putin came to prominence in 1999, therefore, anti-Americanism was 
present in both of the segments of society that he needed. He would never need to worry 
about some pro-American/Western opposition. The positive notion of any politician of 
such a disposition had been thoroughly eviscerated. Shlapentokh goes even further to 
assert that most of the anti-American elite developed a selective disposition to witness 
anything in America and the West in negative and paranoid light, like Putin.292  
Politicians and elites that think and act like Putin in regards to America, thereby, are less 
likely be branded as Western-lackeys and survive elections with Putin’s backing, or at 
least his non-opposition.  80% of Russians firmly believe their politicians only care about 
getting elected and do not care about doing things for the voters.293  And in Russia, as 
discussed in Chapter III, one’s election to office in Putin’s democracy is as dependent on 
Putin as it is on the voters.  
C. PUTIN’S POLITICAL BENEFITS FROM ANTI-AMERICANISM 
Vladimir Putin owes his now fourteen year hold on power as much to the tools 
employed within his hybrid democratic-authoritarian system as to any genuine 
democratic appeal he may have. Anti-Americanism has become a critical element in the 
domestic political calculations of the Russian strongman. Anti-Americanism is being 
employed as a tool on both facets of his domestic power-structure: the democratic and 
authoritarian sides. Anti-Americanism has allowed Putin to create a foundation of 
similarity between himself and his constituents, both public and elite, thereby allowing 
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him as a “democratically elected” leader to express the consensus opinion of his 
population. Likewise, exploitation of anti-Americanism in rhetoric and policy has been 
used as a means of diversion from the otherwise exploitable shortcomings of the Putinist 
regime. 
1. A Leader Representative of his Constituents 
Putin entered the office of Prime Minister in 1999, and President several months 
later, during a period of peak anti-American attitude within both the elite circles and 
public at large. As Shiraev and Zubock so eloquently stated, politicians will always 
emerge to represent a position of a potential base of support, regardless of how strange or 
counter-productive said policy may be. 294  And Putin was the perfect Russian politician, 
now at the top of the elite political class, to represent the anti-American sentiments of 
both the elites and the public at the turn of the 21st century. By the time of his second 
term, Putin’s authoritarian-revival kicked into high gear. His anti-Americanism-
propaganda machine revitalized widespread anti-Americanism. Putin could, thereby, 
portray himself as the democratically-legitimized and fervent anti-American leader of an 
anti-American nation. 
The anti-Americanism that the Putinist machine manipulated could thereby be 
exploited to justify the anti-American tendencies of the ruling class. Figure 1 and 
previous sections show the general volatility of overall Russian public attitude toward the 
United States. That attitude volatility coincided with periods of high Putinist exploitation 
of anti-American news and propaganda. Members of the ruling class, including Putin, are 
able to “exaggerate the hostility of the Russian masses…to strengthen their own 
opinions.”295  This is but further evidence supporting a domestic-political positive-
feedback loop in anti-Americanism:  the Putinists inflame the anti-Americanism of the 
populace, which compels the political elites to more vociferously portray their anti-
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Americanism, which in turn necessitates additional exploitation of anti-American 
propaganda by the Putinist machine, which further inflames the populace, etc. The 
feedback cycle continues. Anti-Americanism has become self-perpetuating, allowing 
Putin and his ilk to legitimately share at least one disposition with the constituent 
segments that he relies upon for his position, even though the general public’s widespread 
anti-American disposition is manufactured and manipulated by Putin. 
2. Distract the Constituents 
Putin’s anti-Americanism, therefore, has allowed him to demonstrate common-
cause with his populace, to be representative of them by sharing anti-American 
sentiments. But his public’s anti-Americanism remains less than genuine given the ease 
with which Putin can influence it. Anti-American rhetoric and policy from Putin’s 
Kremlin also serves one of the quintessential functions inherently desired by so many 
authoritarian leaders: distraction. That distraction can come in several variants and incur 
several benefits. Ole Holsti theorizes that many leaders around the globe show anti-
American tendencies as a method of “strategic scapegoating.”  They proceed to lay blame 
for their country’s ills upon the United States in hopes of distracting from their own 
leadership or governing shortcomings.296  Putin definitely resorted to this type of 
scapegoating when he launched his campaign to demonize the Yeltsin-era government 
system; American-style democracy became guilty by association for the Yeltsin-era 
turmoil.   
Putin’s anti-American exploitation also serves to distract the nation from the 
critical domestic issues at the center of any mass protests or movements. Anti-
Americanism has become a routine tool to “defuse support for opposition leaders” that 
could arise to harness any swelling popular movement against the regime.297  By 
denouncing any domestic opposition as cohorts of the foreign enemy, anti-American  
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stereotyping of the opposition can distract any Russian observers of the real motives and 
messages of the movement, like criticism of Putin’s authoritarian policies or domestically 
repressive laws, etc. 
Equally important, but connected to the aforementioned benefits of distraction by 
means of anti-Americanism, is the notion of keeping the elites and public from uniting in 
contestation of Putin’s perpetual hold on power. The result of such union behind common 
cause, as discussed in Chapter III, could bring the Putinist machine down. Anti-
Americanism, therefore, has become a critical tool to keep the masses and the elites, 
especially those that may already be disaffected, from uniting in opposition to Putin and 
or his cronies. Small, enduring, and or repeated acts of protest from the masses could be 
interpreted by the elites as signals of weakness of the regime, compelling others to join in 
the movement(s). The Putin regime cannot overtly repress such movements in true 
authoritarian fashion lest they undermine their claims at democratic legitimacy and 
recognition of political freedoms.298  The Putin regime, therefore, must accommodate 
levels of political freedom but simultaneously avoid the emergence of potentially 
dangerous mass-opposition that signals weakness.299  Weakness would attract the sharks 
to the feeding frenzy; disaffected elites might smell blood in the water and rally beside 
the masses; the union of the two could subsequently bring down the system. One 
solution: unleash the anti-American machine, as detailed above, to discredit any such 
movement or individuals leading it before a union of public and elites can transpire. 
Like the communist party bosses before him, Putin’s Kremlin’s machine has 
proven adept at provoking anti-American, anti-foreign, and xenophobic emotions 
throughout the nation to effectively distract Russians from the other, more individually 
salient, problems.300  Anti-Americanism, and the inherent hostility, fear, or at least 
apprehension toward the United States that it entails, is a powerful weapon for an 
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authoritarian leader. Ole Holsti also posits that global anti-Americanism could be as 
much an effect of American public relations failures as anything else; publics simply do 
not have sufficient information about the United States to form positive opinions.301  This 
could definitely be the case in Russia, where overwhelming reliance on Putinist-
controlled mass media implies a lack of non-anti-American biased information. This 
means that all the Russian populace gets to see is information that further inflames those 
anti-American attitudes and emotions of fear or consternation. Putin’s provoking of those 
feelings, thereby, allows him to further the much-employed claims of himself as a 
Russian “savior” in the face of external hostility toward Russia.302  Such a notion is 
routinely vocalized by Putin or his surrogates. Putin’s deputy prime minister Dmitry 
Rogozin, in 2012, asserted that “Putin is the only leader left in Europe who has not been 
run over by a steamroller of American hegemony.”303   
Distraction, distraction, distraction; it is a powerful ends; anti-Americanism is the 
means. One cannot overestimate the political benefits garnered by Putin employing his 
anti-American tool to distract the Russian nation at large. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Just how anti-American is Russia beyond Putin’s inner circle?  Mendelson and 
Gerber hold that the “Putin Generation” of young Russian adults is extremely receptive to 
the regime’s anti-Americanism and most youths hold similarly deep anti-American 
convictions.304  The young adults of Putin’s Russia were the adolescents of Yeltsin’s 
Russia. Such a notion conforms to some of the findings in this chapter; these people 
would have been in early maturity during the later 1990s, as the anti-American upswing 
gained momentum. Putin, therefore, became the politician of the moment who happened 
to share the same animosity toward the United States as they had recently re-developed. 
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Putin has effectively re-inflamed his country’s anti-Americanism of late by simply 
professing those beliefs that he has harbored for the duration of his adult life.  
As evidenced, the Russian public’s level of anti-American hostility fluctuates. It 
increases the more Putin exhibits his own inherent anti-Americanism. A primary impetus 
for such fluctuation: the Putinist authoritarian-social manipulation mechanisms. Anti-
Americanism by Putin, thereby, has become simply another tool at Putin’s disposal to 
sway his nation’s moods. The Putin machine may thereby exploit those moods for 
political benefit. Putin entered office during a time of resurgent popular anti-
Americanism and has since succeeded in fanning the flames of discontent toward the 
United States, with public anti-Americanism rising and subsiding in parallel with the 
anti-Americanism displayed by Putin’s machine. Vladimir Shlapentokh and Masha 
Lipman would concur with such an assessment.305  So the relationship between Putin’s 
and the Russian public’s anti-Americanism has become perpetual; Putin’s anti-
Americanism inflames the public’s anti-Americanism, allowing Putin’s anti-
Americanism to subsequently feed off of the public’s anti-Americanism. The current 
Russian public’s anti-Americanism may be widespread, but remains largely only skin 
deep, and could be easily transformed by a Putinist government that is unwilling to 
transform it because of a need of it. Anti-Americanism has become a critical element in 
the public domestic politics of Putin’s Russia. 
To prove the significance of anti-Americanism in domestic Russian politics, one 
need look no further than the elite segment of society, specifically those elites serving in 
the public sphere. Anti-Americanism among lower politicians in the 1990s eventually 
compelled a once ardent pro-American Yeltsin government to cede to anti-American 
demands. Since the later 1990s, Anti-Americanism has become a prerequisite philosophy 
to hold public office in Russia. With Putin’s control of the organs of the state, serving in 
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his government necessitates one possess an anti-American philosophy, be it an elected 
position or one subject to appointment by Putinists.306 
Anti-Americanism, exacerbated in the public and exploited by the elites, has 
garnered distinct and beneficial political repercussions for Vladimir Putin and his hybrid 
authoritarian-democratic regime: conformity and distraction. Putin, intrinsically anti-
American, shares a common belief with those constituents that he depends upon for his 
perpetual hold on power, namely the elites and the public. A politician that does not 
represent the will of the people that he was “elected” to represent will not be a politician 
for long. Anti-Americanism on the part of Putin, thereby, only enhances his claim to 
democratic legitimacy. Putin represents the voice of the people who “elected” him, 
enunciating their beliefs, like anti-Americanism, even if such a belief is manipulated by 
the very man claiming to represent those people. In an authoritarian-like system, the 
credibility of Putin’s hold on all levers of power is contingent upon the people and the 
elites not challenging him over it. That necessitates distracting those segments from any 
underlying problems that could be associated with his regime’s control, as well as 
distracting them from the true intent of any rising opposition movement or leader. 
Employing anti-Americanism in those distractive tactics has proven most effective. 
Distracting the two pillar segments of society to keep them from forming common cause 
against the regime has effectively allowed Putin, like Napoleon, to negate his 
opposition’s potentially superior numbers by keeping them divided.  
The domestic political ramifications of Vladimir Putin’s anti-Americanism, 
therefore, can be as equally compelling as its effects on the global scene of international 
relations and foreign policy. A better understanding of the internal nature of the Russian 
strongman’s anti-American impetuses could provide for a more nuanced interpretation of 
just why he does what he does both in and outside Russia, rather than relying so much on 
stereotypical interpretations of the man as simple crazy.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. RUSSIAN ANTI-AMERICANISM: THE MAN, THE MACHINE, AND 
THE NATION   
This thesis sought to investigate anti-Americanism in Russia and evaluate the 
nature of such anti-Americanism within Vladimir Putin (the man), the Putinist 
government (the machine), and the Russian society at large (the nation). This work then 
strove to determine any correlation between the three and the domestic political 
implications of Putinist anti-Americanism within Russia. A revisit of the central 
questions posed by this thesis: (1) What are the roots of Vladimir Putin’s anti-
Americanism as well as the anti-American tendencies of segments of the Russian 
populace from the 1990s to present day? (2) What is the relationship between the 
progression of Putin’s anti-Americanism and the anti-American sympathies of the 
Russian public? and, (3) What are the potential domestic political benefits garnered by 
Putin’s hybrid authoritarian regime as a result of his anti-American rhetoric and policy 
positions?   
1. Summary of Findings 
What is Putinist anti-Americanism?  Scholars like Katzenstein, Keohane, and 
Krastev hold that anti-Americanism cannot be simplified to a single-issue phenomenon; it 
is a much more deeply psychological condition or outlook that permeates the entire 
spectrum of one’s perspective toward America.307  Vladimir Putin has demonstrated such 
an extended pattern of anti-Americanism as portrayed by his rhetoric, actions, and policy 
initiatives. One can trace the roots of Putin’s anti-Americanism a half century prior to his 
presidency, to previous life experiences. From youth growing up in the Soviet Union 
through law school and service in the KGB, Vladimir Putin developed an anti-American 
cognitive pre-disposition.  
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In light of Robert Jervis’s four strength determinative influences for cognitive 
pre-disposition, Putin’s experience in the Cold War and Soviet anti-Western machine 
would have permanently conditioned his psyche toward an acrimonious perception of the 
United States. Did the person experience the event first hand?  Did the event occur in the 
person’s early adult life?  Did the event result in big consequences for the individual’s 
nation or the individual himself?  Was the person familiar enough with the international 
environment that alternative explanations or perceptions regarding the event in question 
were possible?  All four of these variables are applicable to Putin’s experience in the 
Cold War and KGB. Jervis would contend that those events, and in the case of this thesis 
the anti-Americanism intrinsic in those events, would have dramatically affected Putin’s 
perceptions of the United States. Those perceptions became engrained in the cognitive 
psychology of Putin during the Cold War and remain to the modern day.308 
Sidelined to an observer for most of the 1990s, Putin could witness apparent 
slighting of Yeltsin’s Russia by the United States, indicating that current and recent 
American actions remain analogous to past American actions, actions inherently hostile 
to Russia. Vladimir Putin’s anti-American outward volume fluctuated during the early 
2000s and in the wake of 9/11, but persisted on an internal psychological/cognitive level. 
It was always there and always will be there, even if the level of vociferousness alters 
between a whisper and a shout. After the United States rebuffed Putin’s efforts to partner 
and integrate with the West, Putin’s calculation of American actions only further proves 
the validity of his cognitive pre-dispositions: America is inherently hostile and his anti-
Americanism is justified. Such a notion is expertly summarized by Ole Holsti who holds 
that people and governments worldwide tend to perceive American actions in any way 
that justifies the sustainment of their entrenched pre-conceptions.309  This thesis surmises, 
therefore, that Vladimir Putin has been, is, and will be inherently anti-American.   
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Putin’s Russia has become “a ramshackle authoritarian system with some 
democratic trappings.”310  The hybrid democratic-authoritarian nature of the Putinist state 
implies that, in theory, the remnants of democratic foundations might pose an actual risk 
to the Putinist regime’s survival. This reality necessitates the regime’s employment of 
authoritarian mechanisms to rigidly regulate the remaining democratic practices. 
Elections are held but engineered to guarantee Putinist victories; opposition parties exist 
but are administratively relegated into an insurmountable competitive disadvantage when 
matched against the ruling Putinist party. As long as Russians remain materialistically 
better-off compared to Yeltsin years, they shall remain largely aloof from the public 
sphere and maintain a default vote of confidence in Putin and his less-than-liberal 
constitutionalism. The public, mobilized onto the streets like in 2011, and joined by 
disaffected elites could pose a serious challenge to the hybrid system. This makes the 
authoritarian Putin’s need to keep one or both segments loyal, or at least ambivalent, that 
much more pressing. Economic success has thus far placated the masses and the elites, as 
well as threats of authoritarian repression upon those with power who might seek to use it 
against the regime, namely wealthy elites.311   
Anti-Americanism has become yet another asset in Putin’s authoritarian toolbox. 
In conjunction with the other authoritarian mechanisms, Putin employs them all in 
procuring continued political benefits like public and elite support, or at least their 
distraction. This thesis further concludes that the level of the public’s hostility toward 
America tends to increase or decrease in conjunction with an increasing or decreasing 
level of anti-American vehemence displayed by Putin’s Kremlin, as gauged by its 
messages and propaganda. The Russian public’s level of anti-American hostility 
fluctuates by means of the Putinist authoritarian-social manipulation mechanisms, 
allowing Putin to sway his nation’s moods as he deems prudent. Putin came to power 
during a time of resurgent popular anti-Americanism and has since succeeded in fanning 
the flames of discontent toward the United States. Shlapentokh and Lipman voice a 
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similar sentiment.312  Like some of the anti-Americanism present in limited sectors of the 
general public, The Russian elites’ anti-Americanism also pre-dates Putin’s presidency 
and has become a quintessential characteristic for advancement or survival in the regime 
and in the remnant democratic electoral processes. Putin in 1999, therefore, became the 
politician of the moment who happened to share the same animosity toward the United 
States as had been recently re-established within the public and the majority of the elites. 
Putin did not sow the seeds of wide Russian anti-Americanism. Public and elite anti-
Americanism germinated before Putin, but has truly flowered under Putin. 
2. The Russian Connection: Anti-Americanism and the Putin-State-
Polity Link 
Based on the findings in this thesis, a perpetual relationship has become 
established between Vladimir Putin’s anti-Americanism and the Russian populace’s anti-
Americanism, to include the public and elite sectors. Putin’s anti-Americanism, by means 
of his authoritarian mechanisms, sufficiently arouses the public’s anti-Americanism, 
thereby allowing Putin and the political elites to further feed off of that public 
temperament. The current Russian public’s anti-Americanism could be easily reduced by 
a Putinist government that is unwilling to orchestrate its reduction because the Putinist 
government needs it. Anti-Americanism has become a critical element in the public 
domestic politics of Putin’s Russia. Putin has perfected the practice of employing the 
state mechanisms inherent within his hybrid authoritarian-democratic regime to fully 
exploit anti-Americanism to garner distinct domestic political benefits and subsequently 
ensure the perpetuity of his regime. Anti-Americanism has become a tool for Putin to 
demonstrate democratic political conformity while simultaneously providing 
authoritarian political distraction.   
Putin, intrinsically anti-American, can share a common conviction with the public 
and elites, both of whom his hold on power relies. A politician unable to represent any 
commonality with the society he was “elected” to represent may not be allowed to 
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represent such people for long. Anti-Americanism on the part of Putin, thereby, only 
enhances his claim to democratic legitimacy, because he represents the voice of the 
people who “elected” him, enunciating their beliefs, like anti-Americanism, even though 
that particular belief has been overtly manipulated by the very man claiming to represent 
those people. Anti-Americanism, therefore, is a tool for Putin on both faces of his regime: 
on the democratic side it is used for political conformity and on the authoritarian side, 
political distraction. 
In Putin’s authoritarian-like system, his monopoly on all levers of power remains 
subject to an inability of the masses and the elites to mount a robust challenge to him. 
Anti-Americanism, thereby, can be employed in distracting those segments of society 
from any underlying problems that could be associated with Putin’s regime. Putin’s use 
of anti-Americanism also distracts the population from the true character of any rising 
opposition movement or leader. Any potentially popular anti-Putin policy initiatives that 
the movement or individual champion become muddled in the barrage of accusations 
labeling them as pro-American. Putin’s anti-American tool, therefore, has proven equally 
useful in distracting the two pillar segments of society from forming common cause 
against the regime. 
In summary, anti-Americanism in the Russian domestic sphere has become 
interwoven within the linkages connecting Putin (the man), the Putinist hybrid state 
system (the machine), and the Russian polity (the nation). Anti-Americanism of the man, 
by way of the machine, has influenced anti-Americanism of the nation; a positive 
feedback relationship between Putin and his polity has developed. The state machine 
powers that loop for the political benefit of Putin and his cadre. 
B. ANTI-AMERICANISM’S ROLE IN THE FUTURE OF RUSSIAN–
AMERICAN RELATIONS 
How can the United States constructively interact with a Russian Federation led 
by an ardent anti-American who has grown quite adept at transposing his inherent anti-
Americanism upon much of his society for domestic political gain?  Can the United 
States simply overlook the Putinist hostility, discounting it as irrelevant in the broader 
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scope of international relations?  If America can look past the phenomenon, should it?  
The fact remains, Russia and the United States represent two states with significant 
leverage on the international scene. Though the extent of Russia’s practical leverage 
remains debatable, interaction among the one current great power and one former and 
aspiring great power are unavoidable, regardless of mutual suspicion between the two.   
1. Most Recent Events 
How can one view the most recent events in U.S.-Russian relations through the 
anti-American prism?  Extreme global tension over the Syrian chemical weapons usage 
seems to have subsided. Cooler heads prevailed in light of an international agreement to 
rid Syria of all its chemical weapons. International agreements on such a scope and scale 
are rare these days, given the differences of opinion on all the most pressing issues 
among the powers at be, especially Russia and the United States. One could view the 
U.N. agreement to destroy Bashar al Assad’s stockpiles in several different ways: Putin 
simply reigned in his ally Assad, or the U.S. inadvertently ceded diplomatic initiative to 
Putin, or the U.S. bluffed its military intentions and the other side folded. The process 
leading up to the landmark international agreement shall be debated for generations. In 
the end, there are fewer WMDs on the planet than before, and, so far, the Assad 
government is cooperating with the U.N. inspection teams and destruction of the weapons 
proceeds on schedule.313  The U.N. entity overseeing the destruction effort even garnered 
a Nobel Peace Prize out of the deal.  
In the face of such rare and effective international cooperation, Russian-American 
relations remain decidedly cool. Putinist antipathy toward the United States remains, with 
the only significant change possibly being Putin’s ego. His renewed confrontational 
attitude toward the United States continues to reap political benefits within Russia and 
outside Russia. Forbes deemed Putin the world’s most powerful global figure of 2013, 
relegating the U.S. President to second place given Putin’s position in the middle of the 
Syrian affair, Russian economic leverage, and an unprecedented and never-ending U.S. 
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House of Representatives’ hamstringing of all of President Obama’s domestic 
initiatives.314  Where American politics seems non-functional due to hyper-partisanship, 
Putin’s domestic politics are stable (i.e., unabashedly controlled) thanks to the Putinist 
machine, of which anti-Americanism has become an essential cog. 
American prestige around the globe has suffered due to ongoing NSA spying 
revelations, most of which continue to originate from Edward Snowden, granted asylum 
by Putin’s Russia. New information, nevertheless, continues to spill from the Snowden 
stolen documents, even though Putin himself reiterated before Snowden was granted 
asylum that “If he wants to stay here, there is one condition: He must stop his activities 
aimed at inflicting damage on our American partners, no matter how strange it may 
sound coming from my lips.”315  Well, Snowden continues to leak like a sieve, doing 
damage to U.S. interests but there is no sign of his forthcoming expulsion from Putinist 
Russia: just another anti-American slight in a long line of anti-American slights from 
Vladimir Putin. Putinist controlled media continues to highlight the U.S. spying programs 
while barely mentioning reports of Russian espionage incidents, including recording 
devices placed in G20 leaders’ welcome baskets in St. Petersburg. Putin’s government 
simply discredits any such allegations: “We don’t know the sources of the 
information…However, this is undoubtedly nothing but an attempt to shift the focus from 
issues that truly exist in relations between European capitals and Washington to 
unsubstantiated, non-existent issues.”316  This statement was courtesy of Putin’s 
spokesman Dmitry Peskov towing the official Kremlin line and reverting any domestic 
conversation back to negative and inflated stories of America. Anti-Americanism, 
therefore, remains central to ongoing events in Putin’s Russia. 
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2. How Can America Cope? 
The question remains: how can (or should) America cope with an anti-American 
Putinist Russia?  How should U.S. leaders perceive the nature of Putin’s and his nation’s 
anti-American bent in light of the observations posed by this thesis?  Analyzing the 
seemingly anti-American policies of Putin, both foreign and domestic, without 
considering his internal political situation seems fundamentally impractical. 
Given the authoritarian nature of Vladimir Putin operating under the guise of 
democratic legitimacy, the politics behind his foreign policy must be given equal 
consideration as the foreign policy itself. This thesis has demonstrated who Vladimir 
Putin remains beholden to within his domestic realm. Because Putin has established a 
hybrid-authoritarian system in which his position is not completely full proof, his 
domestic audience of elites and mass public could, in theory, punish him with removal. 
Jessica Weeks, in studying international affairs and conflict involving authoritarian 
leaders, would characterize Putin as a nonpersonalist leader, or one who has “strong 
incentives to attend to the preferences of their domestic audience” in matters of foreign 
relations or international confrontation.317  In Putin’s case as detailed in this thesis, his 
domestic audience is composed of independently strong anti-American elites and an anti-
American general public made so by Putin. The preferences of Putin’s domestic 
audience, therefore, remain that their government (Putin) should remain stubborn and or 
confrontational toward the United States. Poll numbers lend credence to such a 
consensus, with vast majorities of Russians since 2003 classifying the United States as a 
violent aggressor country.318  Putin, therefore, should stand up to the United States. 
Weeks further theorizes that an autocrat’s actions in the international arena may 
be attributable to that autocrat’s audience cost at home. Threats made by authoritarian or 
largely non-democratic leaders on the world stage could be more credible because 
backing down from such threats could incur negative audience costs for the leader; his 
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audience could punish him for backing down.319  In Weeks’ model, the autocrat’s 
primary domestic audience is regime elites who could organize the leader’s downfall. In 
Putin’s case, however, the Russian society’s elites and the mass public could orchestrate 
the regime’s failure. Putin’s calculation of audience costs for backing down from (i.e., 
dramatically altering or reversing) his regime’s anti-Americanism could be more complex 
and wide-ranging. 
Or, perhaps, “it’s the foreign policy, stupid.”320  Should America assume that we 
alone are primarily to blame for Putinist/Russian and greater global anti-Americanism?  
If the United States wants to pacify some of the anti-American rancor present beyond its 
borders, then perhaps it must change its foreign policies and seek actions to improve 
America’s image rather than continually tarnishing it, or so Juan Cole contends.321   More 
humble-humanitarian and less militaristic policies could improve America’s global 
appearance.   
More YouTube videos of American aid to suffering people will not likely compel 
the Russian President to be less anti-American. The best approach that the United States 
should take in dealing with the anti-American Putinist Russia of today is likely an 
amalgamation of multiple different approaches. Better global PR represents only one 
possible solution. Deal with Putin for what he is; his rhetoric and policy stances toward 
the United States should be considered partially pragmatic in light of the domestic 
political situation that he created for himself. And Americans should not immediately 
discount U.S. actions as benign and non-incendiary toward Putin and Russia; put oneself 
in his shoes (i.e., mind) and consider how to view American actions through his 
historically paranoid perspective. Putin is anti-American; Putin is an authoritarian; Putin 
does benefit politically from anti-Americanism; Russian/Putinist anti-Americanism is not 
going anywhere. 
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C. FINAL ANALYSIS 
Vladimir Putin’s current six-year term as President of the Russian Federation ends 
in 2018, with a constitutionally-viable option for another six year term. So Putin could 
remain the head of the Russian state for the next decade, or longer, for he has yet to show 
any inclination toward ceding his power. Putin, therefore, is not going anywhere; the 
United States must interact with him regardless of our personal feelings toward him. 
Putin has engineered a political system contingent upon his perpetual placement atop the 
power-pyramid. That placement has been secured over nearly a decade of power and 
political consolidation, using all means available to him: public discrediting of any 
alternative, authoritarian electioneering, and anti-American exploitation.     
Though America may frown upon the undemocratic nature of Putin’s system and 
the propagated anti-American hostility that has become a cornerstone, Putin’s existence 
at the top carries a level of stability. The world is getting smaller. Instability anywhere in 
the world tends to have second and third order effects and implications to all the major 
world players. Regional crises owing to state political instability are becoming ever-more 
commonplace around the globe. As American relative power wanes, our ability to deal 
with and offset so many crises becomes unlikely. An internally stable anti-American 
Russia led by a man inherently acrimonious toward the United States, but so far 
unwilling to truly push the envelope toward open and violent hostility, seems like an all-
around better option for the world environment than some of the alternatives. 
The United States must interact with Russia one way or another in this ever-
changing global dynamic. Understanding the nature and impetuses of Putinist Russia’s 
anti-Americanism could go a long way in aiding American policy-makers’ perception of 
just why Putin and Russia do what they do. By better understanding Putin’s political 
situation within his state and the political necessity of anti-American rhetoric and policy, 
Western entities might be better able to interact with Vladimir Putin rather than 
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